

CAMBODIA: A CASE STUDY IN DECISION-MAKING

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This social studies curriculum unit is designed to help teachers take advantage of their students' great interest in current events. Not only do the materials included here provide a clear picture of the decision to intervene in Cambodia, but they are also presented in a format that will help you lead your students toward an understanding of more complex matters as well. We have tried to use only readily available sources. No obscure treaties or party documents are included. We have used a broad variety of sources: America's three national newspapers, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Christian Science Monitor; the late Robert F. Kennedy's book, Thirteen Days; Le Monde, a leading French newspaper; occasional scholarly materials; and finally some "radical" newspapers and magazines. We have tried to reproduce the range of information sources that are available to the average citizen. While the "secret information" available to the government may add detail, we do not believe that government policy is so complicated that the average student cannot understand it.

We start with the American decision to move troops from South Vietnam to Cambodia and offer three general statements that might explain why this decision was made. These statements, which are in the form of explanatory hypotheses, suggest that the move was made for one or more of the following reasons:

The Cambodian intervention was necessary to assure the survival and continued high status of the United States in the world.

The Cambodian intervention was necessary to protect American economic interests abroad and because war stimulates the growth of the American economy.

The Cambodian intervention only appeared to be necessary from the information available to the President; in other words, it was an error in judgement based on inadequate consideration of the effects of the decision.

Each section of this curriculum package opens with a statement of the explanatory hypothesis it covers. This general statement is followed by a series of questions designed to lead to an understanding of the hypothesis. Each teacher will judge how best to use this introductory material. Some will choose to use it as a guide to preparing their own classroom discussion. Others will give the general statement and then use the questions to initiate discussion.

The general statements and general questions are followed by selected source material--most of it from recent newspapers--which provide the information needed for a discussion of the hypothesis. We have not attempted to provide complete information. The articles and selections included were chosen to illustrate the points raised in the discussion questions which appear with them. It is hoped that these materials can be reproduced for each student as outside reading so that he will come into class prepared for a more far-ranging discussion. Students also should be encouraged to bring in articles which support or make doubtful the three hypotheses we have presented.

The purpose of these specific questions attached to the selections in the curriculum is to involve students in speculative discussion about how and why the decision was made to go into Cambodia. After discussing each of the three sections of the curriculum extensively, you may wish to ask the students to consider the three general hypotheses. Which is the best explanation? Has any reasonable explanation been omitted? How do the three hypotheses fit together?


The final section can be used to discuss the role of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Students should be encouraged to develop a general position that will help them evaluate future U.S. actions in Indo-China and other parts of Asia.

General Information Section

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The material in this section is designed to provide students with general information about Cambodia and about the recent U.S. decision to send American troops there. These articles are provided as factual background for those students who are not aware of what the decision and its immediate consequences were. Later sections will discuss the implications of the decision in greater detail.

After students have read the material in this section, it may be useful to divide them into small groups to discuss possible reasons for the Cambodian decision. These "educated guesses" could be recorded and referred to throughout the later sections. This exercise is useful as it makes each student voice his initial assumptions and makes these assumptions public and open to evaluation. Also, it provides a base of comparison against which the student can evaluate what he has learned at the end of the curriculum.



By Russell H. Lenz, chief cartographer

A Fact Sheet issued by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, Harvard University
AREA: 70,000 square miles
POPULATION: 6 1/2 million
GOVERNMENT: Neutralist Kingdom until Army coup of March 1970
ETHNICALLY: 85% Cambodian, 8% Vietnamese, 6% Chinese
CAPITAL: Phnom Penh (pop. 450,000)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: For centuries, Cambodia has sought to preserve its independence and neutrality. Since the 1600's Cambodian territory has been the center of big-power rivalry in Southeast Asia. In 1884, King Norodom was compelled to abandon independence by placing his country under the control of France in order to prevent Cambodia's partition between Vietnam and Thailand.

It was not until 1953 that Cambodia, under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, became free. Sihanouk abdicated his throne in 1955, organized a political party, won an overwhelming majority in national elections, and brought his country into the United Nations.

Sihanouk was convinced that too close an association with one side in the cold war would entail the risk of provoking hostilities from the other side as well as diminish Cambodia's independence in foreign and domestic affairs. He therefore waged a ceaseless and brilliant political effort to repel the advances of both the Communists in Indochina and right-wing forces encouraged by the U.S. As a result, Cambodia survived and acquired prestige and influence far in excess of what the mere size and strength of the country would seem to have justified.

In the process of maintaining neutrality, Sihanouk found it necessary to sever relations with the U.S. when it appeared that the CIA was seeking to overthrow him. He renounced U.S. aid, even though he thereby ran the risk of increased domestic pressure due to the resultant economic austerity. On the other hand, Sihanouk in 1967 denounced Communist Chinese intervention into Cambodian affairs and announced the withdrawal of the Cambodian embassy in Peking. In 1968, he rejected an offer of substantial direct aid from China because too many strings were attached. Last year, after prolonged negotiations, Sihanouk resumed diplomatic negotiations with the U.S. after Washington finally agreed to recognize Cambodia's frontiers and territorial integrity.

In carrying out this balancing act in order to preserve a policy of virtually unarmed neutrality, Sihanouk unwillingly was forced to submit to a modicum of foreign military intervention. On one hand, the Viet Cong used portions of Cambodia's eastern provinces for logistical purposes. On the other hand, the CIA and Green Berets recruited, paid, and trained Cambodian mercenaries to fight the Communists in Vietnam.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: From 1966 on, Sihanouk's policies came under increasing attack from the right-of-center General Lon Nol, who exploited the Cambodian Army's discontent with economic austerity necessitated by Sihanouk's rejection of foreign aid. For the Army, this policy meant aggravating cut-backs in military spending. To strengthen his hand, Lon Nol played up the issue of the Viet Cong in Cambodia in order to force Sihanouk to abandon neutrality in favor of a more militaristic approach which would step up the flow of funds into the hands of Cambodia's generals.

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CAMBODIA FACT SHEET--continued

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In the absence of any American or international support for his policy of neutrality, Sihanouk felt compelled last summer to establish Lon Nol as premier of Cambodia. Once in a position of political power, Lon Nol soon took steps to increase Army salaries and attempted to remove foreign policy from Sihanouk's control. This past March, in an attempt to further Cambodia's neutralism, Sihanouk traveled to Moscow and Peking to seek support for reducing the Viet Cong presence on Cambodian soil. While he was away, Lon Nol instigated riots against the North Vietnamese and Chinese Embassies in Phnom Penh in an attempt to embarrass Sihanouk. Then, aware of Washington's long-standing coolness toward Sihanouk, and relying upon the U.S. to support an anti-neutralist coup, Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk's government and launched a massacre of Vietnam residents of Cambodia (most of whom were not Communists, but nationals of the Saigon Government).

The U.S. response to the end of nearly two decades of Cambodian neutrality was to mount an invasion of Cambodia.

WHERE DO WE STAND IN CAMBODIA? By relying as we have for the past ten

years, on arms rather than diplomacy, we have destroyed the possibility of Cambodian neutrality - which, for all its shortcomings, was greatly in our interest. --Sihanouk has been forced to accept the support of Peking and Hanoi for an all-Indochina front against the U.S. --The Lon Nol regime, unable to remain in power without outside help, has discredited itself internationally and has turned to us for support.

The invasion has exposed our troops and our nation to greater danger.

If we leave Cambodia, the border areas will be reoccupied by the other side. If we stay, they will simply move a few miles west, while our forces are spread even thinner. In the meantime, our invasion has not destroyed or even located the alleged enemy headquarters, but instead has devastated the Cambodian countryside, paving the way for Communist mobilization of rural Cambodian opinion against the U.S.

Not an Invasion--President Terms Extension of War to Save G.I. Lives
by Robert B. Semple, Jr.

WASHINGTON, April 30--In a sharp departure from the previous conduct of war in Southeast Asia, President Nixon announced tonight that he was sending United States combat troops into Cambodia for the first time.

White House sources indicated that even as the President was addressing the nation on television, several thousand American soldiers were moving across the border from South Vietnam to Cambodia to attack what Mr. Nixon described as "the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam."

The President expects the operation to last six weeks to two months.

The area was described by sources here as the Fishhook area of Cambodia, some 50 miles northwest of Saigon.

War Area Extended

The President described the action as "not an invasion of Cambodia" but a necessary extension of the Vietnam war designed to eliminate a major Communist staging and communications area. Thus it is intended to protect the lives of American troops and shorten the war.

The President further described the action as "indispensable" for the continued success of his program of Vietnamization--under which he has been withdrawing American ground combat troops as the burden of fighting is gradually shifted to the South Vietnamese.

The President's rhetoric was tough--probably the toughest of his tenure in office--and was reminiscent of some of the speeches of Lyndon B. Johnson during the last years of his term as President.

Mr. Nixon's address came as Washington was still trying to digest the Defense Department's announcement yesterday that the United States had agreed to provide combat advisers, tactical air support and other forms of assistance to South Vietnamese troops attacking Communist bases in Cambodia.

The South Vietnamese offensive, involving thousands of troops, began yesterday morning and provoked widespread surprise, anger and frustration on Capitol Hill, mixed with quick expressions of support from some of the President's Congressional allies.

Many legislators, particularly Senators with a long history of opposition to the Vietnam war, saw the Cambodian action as a dangerous expansion of the conflict and a prelude to American involvement in still another Southeast Asian nation.

Informed sources reported that more than 1,200 telegrams arrived at the White House last night after the new operation in Cambodia had been announced--an unusually large number on an issue on which the President himself had not yet made a public statement.

There was no indication of the tenor of these messages but a recent Gallup poll indicated that public approval of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policies had dropped from a high of 65 percent in January to 48 percent in early April. Therefore tonight's address was regarded in the White House as having considerable political as well as diplomatic significance.

After the Defense Department announcement yesterday, Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, began drafting legislation that would preclude use of any funds appropriated by Congress for military assistance or operations in Cambodia. This would be attached as an amendment to a military sales bill now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Some of the critics of yesterday's move--including Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate majority leader--were among a dozen or so Congressional leaders from both parties who gathered at the White House at 8 p.m., one hour before the President was scheduled to go on the air, for an advance briefing from Mr. Nixon in the Cabinet room adjacent to the Oval Room, the President's office. Members of the Cabinet also attended.

Basis for Decision Explained

During the briefing, Mr. Nixon was said to have summarized the speech and to have set forth the Administration's rationale for the decision to authorize American participation in the South Vietnamese offensive against areas that have served as sanctuaries for Communist forces on the Cambodian side of the border.

The main justification for the move offered yesterday and again this morning, in public statements and private conversations, was that North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops operating from Cambodia had posed an "increasing threat" to the lives of American servicemen in South Vietnam and, more broadly, to the Vietnamization program. Under this program the Nixon Administration is seeking to disengage itself from the conflict by turning over the main combat burden to the South Vietnamese.

The offensive, Daniel Z. Henskin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, declared at a briefing yesterday, "is a necessary and effective measure to save American and other free-world lives and to strengthen the Vietnamization program."

In private, officials conceded that Mr. Nixon had deliberately chosen to widen the conflict--temporarily, they said--in an effort to bring it to an end more quickly.

Top Aides Visit Capitol

This was essentially the approach taken by Administration officials who circulated on Capitol Hill today explaining the Administration's point of view. Both the Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. Richardson, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, were dispatched to the Capitol to brief Republican Senators on Mr. Nixon's reasoning.

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New York Times - May 1, 1970, p. 1

The operation, which involved cooperation between South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces, was aimed at "dealing with the threat of Communist infiltration into South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese border areas." It was also intended to "help the Cambodian Government defend its borders against the Viet Cong."

It was emphasized that the joint South Vietnamese-United States operation on Cambodian territory should not be construed as Mr. Nixon's answer to the request made by Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia for military aid.

This distinction has been drawn carefully and emphatically in nearly every utterance on the Cambodian situation by Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary. This apparently reflects an effort to persuade newsmen that the operation in Cambodia is no more than an extension of the Vietnam operation and does not represent a commitment of United States manpower to the Government of Cambodia.

More than three weeks ago, Lieut. Gen. Lon Nol appealed to the United States, along with other countries, to provide weapons for an expansion of his 35,000-man army to about 200,000 men. As an interim measure, Washington agreed last week to supply several thousand captured AK-47 automatic rifles of Soviet design and Chinese manufacture, through the South Vietnamese.

RESULTS UNCERTAIN IN FIRST CAMBODIAN FORAYS

SAIGON--It is, of course, precisely what the generals here have always longed for: the chance to sweep through the enemy's sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia and smash them once and for all. But last Friday, the eighth day of the massive allied operation across the border, there was a distinct uneasiness among the military men at the headquarters of the United States command here.

The officers who were most enthusiastic about the operation at the outset had become defensive about it. Although none would admit it publicly and few had the heart to concede it privately, the sweep clearly was not going as well as they originally had hoped it would.

The Navy entered into the operation yesterday as a force of American and South Vietnamese vessels began a mission up the Mekong River toward Phnom Penh. The purpose was to neutralize enemy bases in the area and to carry relief supplies to the Cambodian capital.

To be sure, the estimated 25,000 American and South Vietnamese troops that were scouring the Cambodian terrain at six points along the border were turning up large caches of enemy weapons, munitions and supplies. Military sources yesterday announced the discovery and wrecking of a 300-ton stockpile of munitions and food about 80 miles northwest of Saigon. They described the enemy cache as the biggest ever found in the war.

But they had not found COSVN, the supreme Communist military headquarters that President Nixon had said was the prime target of the operation, nor any of the top commanders, nor significant numbers of enemy troops. In short, they had nothing spectacular in the way of results to justify the largest and most intensive operation launched by allied forces in at least two years, no coonskin to nail on the wall.

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When Mr. Nixon announced at his Friday night press conference that the operation was proceeding better than had been expected and was running ahead of schedule, the officers replied weakly that of course the President had all the facts and they wouldn't want to comment on his assessment.

To put the best possible face on the operation, the Army's huge propaganda mill cranked up and began to churn. Army photographers were flown to the site of each new cache as it was discovered and prints of their pictures were rushed to Washington for distribution.

In Saigon, the command summoned the press corps to Pentagon East, as the sprawling headquarters is called, and trundled out a battery of briefing officers for a pre-packaged, up-beat progress report. Colored slides were flashed on the screen in the Chief of Staff's briefing room and mimeographed sheets were distributed that read "Cumulative results--Cambodian operations."

The sheets listed the total enemy killed (1,290 as of May 8), individual weapons captured (4,656) and tons of rice captured (886), but ignored some of the more distasteful categories, such as American aircraft lost in Cambodia (at least nine helicopters and one fixed wing plane, in which a total of 12

Americans were killed and three were wounded.) In all, the list said, 43 Americans died in the first week of fighting in Cambodia and 148 were wounded.

There was no discussion at the briefing of the destruction of the Cambodian town of Snoul, which was leveled on Tuesday by American tanks, or of the civilians displaced, or of the half-dozen American soldiers who, in frustration and fear, had refused orders to go into Cambodia and were facing possible court martial as a result. Instead, the emphasis was on disruption of the enemy supply system and the destruction of his "base areas."

None of this is to say that the operation is or necessarily will be a failure. Even those Americans here who have been critical of it from the beginning agree that it is too early to say whether it will produce military results commensurate with its political cost. All that is possible at this point is to speculate on the outcome--at its theoretical best and worst.

At its best, in the opinion of senior American officers here, the operation might so seriously cripple the enemy's lifeline of supplies that the North Vietnamese will be incapable of prosecuting the war in the southern half of South Vietnam. They would then, the theory goes, have to face the hard choice of fighting on only in the northern regions, or negotiating seriously at the bargaining table in Paris. At this early stage, only the most boundlessly optimistic officers here believe the operation will prove to be that successful and decisive.

THE WORST FACE--At its worst, the Cambodian operation might fail to make a serious dent in the enemy's logistical network, and their capacity to continue the war might be unaffected except for a delay of a few weeks or months while they rebuild destroyed huts and bunkers. The top Communist commanders might simply resume their duties from other base areas located more deeply inside Cambodia. The new government in Phnom Penh might be even more imperiled because of the proximity of the Communist command.

"After all," said one American officer who believes the operation was ill-conceived from the first, "all we are getting over there is rice and weapons, not people. Well, China can supply them with all the rice they need and Russia has more than enough weapons to replace everything we find. So a few months after this thing is over, we'll be back to square one."

Both these extremes represent minority views. The vast majority of the American officers here expect that the final results will fall somewhere in the middle--that the enemy supply system will be seriously hurt and the allies will win a reprieve of some duration from Communist attacks. Few of them, however, are prepared to say that the damage will prove decisive.

Terence Smith

128 U.S. PLANES CARRY OUT ATTACK IN NORTH VIETNAM; SUPPLY DUMPS ARE TARGET--
HANOI CAUTIONED--LAIRD DECLARES AN END TO FOE'S SANCTUARY IN CAMBODIA
by William Beecher

WASHINGTON, May 2--The United States has carried out a large bombing raid in North Vietnam, well-placed Administration sources said today.

The raid was the first since November, 1968, when the United States halted the bombing of North Vietnam. Since then, Washington has acknowledged occasional incidents of " suppressive fire," directed by small numbers of planes against antiaircraft installations threatening American reconnaissance planes.

The targets -- struck by 128 fighter-bombers yesterday or today -- were large supply dumps just above the demilitarized zone and near the entrance to passes leading south, the sources said. They refused to say whether other raids were planned.

HANOI REPORTED RAIDS--The disclosure followed a broadcast by the Hanoi radio that more than 100 American planes struck "yesterday and today" in the provinces of Quang Binh and Nghe An, just north of the demilitarized zone, killing or wounding "many civilians, including 20 children."

American sources confirmed that at least one raid in that region employed 128 bombers of all types. There was no confirmation of North Vietnam's casualty report.

The sources said the raid was "carefully circumscribed" in terms of the area that could be struck. One source denied that it took place near any populated area.

The raid, they said, was authorized by President Nixon shortly after his television address Thursday night, when he announced that American troops would participate in assaults on enemy refuge areas in Cambodia.

Officially, Government spokesmen acknowledged that a raid had taken place but discussed it only in terms of "protective reaction," which in the last year and a half has meant the suppressive fire against air defenses.

The spokesmen refused to discuss the number of planes involved, and refused all comment on the Hanoi broadcast.

Other sources, while less reticent, declined to say whether the air attack on North Vietnam was a single exception to existing policy or would be part of a campaign.

Boston Evening Globe - Tuesday, May 5, 1970

Congress Chiefs Told U.S. to Quit Cambodia Within 7 Weeks--Nixon

United Press International

WASHINGTON -- President Nixon gave leaders of Congress today what was described as a "firm commitment" that all U.S. combat troops now in Cambodia would be pulled back within seven weeks.

Mr. Nixon, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, briefed congressional leaders and members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees for about an hour and a half and then answered questions for half an hour on Mr. Nixon's decisions to send combat troops into Cambodia and to allow brief, new air raids on North Vietnam.

Rep. Richard H. Ichord (D-Mo.), gave this account of the President's promise:

"He assured us that there was no intention of keeping U.S. troops in Cambodia. He was asked if our troops would be out of there by the next fiscal year (which starts July 1) and he replied that 'I'll bring in a new chief of staff if we are not out of there by next July.'"

A member of the Senate Armed Services group, Sen. Harry F. Byrd (D-Va.), said: "The President made it clear that this is a temporary military tactic and that all American troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia within a matter of weeks."

Byrd added, "I would have no information to indicate the contrary."

The President and his advisers were reported to have told participants at the morning session that the Cambodian operation was going well, and that both the withdrawal schedule and the Vietnamization program would have been endangered without it.

Chairman John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee said things are going "right well."

"The withdrawal schedule (from Vietnam) would have been in bad trouble if this action had not been taken," Stennis said. "It is very clearly tied to our Vietnamization program."

One participant said Sen. Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.), spoke critically and apparently heatedly about the operation, which he considered a blunder.

Rep. Robert Stafford (R-Vt.) complained about the failure of the administration to notify members of Congress ahead of time that the United States was sending combat troops into Cambodia.

Mr. Nixon was said to have answered that his promise to consult with Congress before any widening of the war did not apply in this instance since the Cambodian action was not an invasion.

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The White House discussion took place as:

--The Cambodia government of premier Lon Nol issued a statement saying it welcomed the use of U.S. troops in Cambodian territory to try to destroy communist bases and supplies.

--The worst one-day stock market tumble in almost 6½ years, yesterday, was followed by a continued downward trend during today's morning sessions.

--A wave of student protest escalated against the new military moves, with the slaying of four Kent State University students in Ohio followed by disorders on other campuses all across the country.

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External and Internal Threats to U. S. Survival

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1. The first duty of a government is to protect the survival and general welfare of its people. Our enemies are those who are seen to threaten our survival. Therefore, for our own self-protection, we must be more powerful than they are in every sphere.

Do the nations that we consider our enemies feel the same way about us?

What is meant by survival?

Do we have to stay just as we are in order to survive?

At what point does American society cease to survive, e. g.:

loss of economic power outside the U.S.?

loss of political and military influence outside its boundaries?

loss of the present affluence?

loss of its form of government?

loss of its cultural heritage?

Is it possible for the U.S. to survive and co-exist with other nations?

How?

Do we want only to protect the survival of our nation or should we convince others that our system is better and they should adopt our ways?

2. Power is demonstrated by control over people and over geographical territory. It is the ability to make sure that other people do not act on interests in conflict with ours. Power is established and maintained mainly through massive military, economic and cultural aid.

Suppose the survival and development of another country brings it in conflict with our interests. What should the other country do and what should we do? e.g., the other country has oil which is its sole resource; its survival and development depends on sale of this oil. We also have oil. We are powerful and would be able to control the market so that they would find it difficult to develop their resources. (For example, the situation of textiles and the Japanese market.)

Do you think the U.S. does have control over other parts of the world? If so, which and how? e.g., Panama, Guatemala, Vietnam, Okinawa

What is aid? Does U.S. foreign aid benefit the U.S. economy? If so, in what ways?

3. The U.S. and its people are committed to: freedom; equality; democracy with majority rule and minority rights, including the right to vote and the right to dissent; and the individual right to decision-making about jobs, property, where to live, religion, schooling.

Do these values apply equally to all people in the U.S.?

If some people are more powerful can they exercise their rights more easily than others? Does one's amount of power determine one's degree of freedom?

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- i. Are these values important to other countries, such as South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos? If so, are U.S. policies presently harming these values? How far can we go in protecting these values in the U.S.? In what different kinds of ways can we defend them within the borders of the U.S.? The accepted way is to have a strong military to protect the borders of a country. But this tends to escalate as in the current example of Cambodia. Can you think of other ways of self-protection for a nation? What about exploring ways of massive non-violent resistance to the aggressor or non-violent civilian defense?
 4. The Communist bloc is seen as our greatest enemy. Its power is redirected against us. It seeks to expand its sphere of influence. It is committed to a different way of life including: state and common ownership of property, limiting individual profits within the community, limiting individual rights and actions when these are judged to harm the community.

There seems to be a great emphasis on the good of the community in Communist countries. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this policy?

If Indochina is being threatened by the Communist bloc, why are there no Chinese and Soviet troops anywhere in Southeast Asia?

Several nations support Communist forms of government. For example, a state in India has elected a communist government thrice. If other countries have such a different way of life is it our duty to change them? If so, how and at what cost?

change them. If so, how and at what cost?

Marvin E. Gettleman, Vietnam, Greenwich, Connecticut, Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965, page 91-92.

Fear of Impending French Defeat: "Remarks Attributed to Vice-President Richard Nixon, New York Times (April 17, 1954)

... What is to be done [about the war in Indochina]? For one, the problem is not one of materials and wasn't four months ago. More men are needed and the question is where to get them. They will not come from France, for France is tired of the war, as we were tired of Korea. Therefore, additional man power must come from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, particularly Vietnam. The French, however, while slow in training the native soldiers, resent the idea that the United States or others should send men to do the job.

More difficult is the job of spirit. Encouragement must be given to fight and resist. Some say if the French get out, the Vietnamese will fight with more spirit, because they would be fighting for their independence.

But the Vietnamese lack the ability to conduct a war by themselves or govern themselves. If the French withdraw, Indochina would become Communist-dominated within a month.

The United States as a leader of the free world cannot afford further retreat in Asia. It is hoped the United States will not have to send troops there, but if this government cannot avoid it, the Administration must face up to the situation and dispatch forces.

Therefore, the United States must go to Geneva and take a positive stand for united action by the free world. Otherwise it will have to take on the problem alone and try to sell it to the others.

French pressure will be exerted at the conference (beginning April 26) for negotiation and the end of the fighting. The British will take a similar position, because of mounting Labor Party pressure and defections in the Conservative ranks. The British do not want to antagonize Red China, which they have recognized.

This country is the only nation politically strong enough at home to take a position that will save Asia.

Negotiations with the Communists to divide the territory would result in Communist domination of a vital new area. Communist intransigence in Korea perhaps will teach the French and the British the futility of negotiation and bring them over to the plan of "united action" proposed by Secretary of State Dulles....¹

¹ The plan that eventually resulted in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). See pp. 92-69. - ed.

It should be emphasized that if Indochina went Communist, Red pressures would increase on Malaya, Thailand, and Indonesia and other Asian nations. The main target of the Communists in Indochina, as it was in Korea, is Japan. Conquest of areas so vital to Japan's economy would reduce Japan to an economic satellite of the Soviet Union....

1. **Q** This speech was given in 1954. Why did Nixon feel then as it is now that what happens in Indochina concerns us? Do you think the position of Indochina poses a threat to the free world? **A** No, I don't think it does.
2. **Q** Is Nixon primarily worried about the consequences for Indochina or for the United States itself?

3. **Q** Why does he feel the United States has to act alone in Indochina if all else fails? Do you think these reasons could be used to justify the war in Cambodia?

He feels that if we do not act alone, we will be seen as weak and indecisive. He also believes that if we act alone, we will be seen as strong and decisive.

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Soviets, Chinese Reds Circle Each Other's Flank, by Paul Wohl

Each Communist giant currently is probing the other's flank.

Moscow has expressed concern at the medium-range rockets which Chinese Communist technicians reportedly are installing in Albania.

China, on the other hand, is disturbed by the visit to North Korea in the last week of April of Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov, chief of the Soviet general staff.

"Peking's growing activity in the Mediterranean--in the Middle East and in the Balkans" was the topic of an article by Valery Modestov in No. 14 of the Soviet world-affairs weekly, New Times.

Referring to a recent solidarity message to Albania by Chinese Vice-President and Defense Minister Lin Piao, New Times charged that Peking intends to "involve Albania in its military plans."

Quoting Western reports, New Times wrote that "Chinese engineers and specialists are supervising the construction of a missile base at Shkoder [Skutari] in the North. It will be the most northerly of a series of similar bases designed to control the entrance to the Adriatic Sea."

Chinese technicians

In addition to these bases, which apparently are to prevent the Soviet Mediterranean fleet from operating off the Albanian coast, New Times again quoted Western sources to the effect that "medium-range rockets are to be installed in Albania."

Such rockets could be pointed at targets in the southwestern Soviet Union or at Soviet military units entering Romania or Yugoslavia. The missile bases seem to be manned largely by Chinese personnel.

Trial balloon

Yet one wonders whether the danger to the Soviet Union from Chinese rocket-launching pads in Albania is as great or as imminent as the article in New Times intimates.

Had there been irrefutable evidence of Chinese missile installations in Albania capable of launching medium-range rockets, Moscow would have denounced their existence in Pravda and at the United Nations.

The article in New Times may well have been a trial balloon and it certainly was another attempt to suggest to public opinion at home and abroad that the Soviet Union is threatened by China's "militaristic preparations."

Yugoslav commentators significantly have denied the existence of Chinese rocket-launching pads in Albania with indignation and asked whether the New Times version was not part of a Soviet attempt to sow discord among the Balkan peoples.

However this may be, Chinese presence in Albania disturbs the Soviets politically perhaps even more than militarily. Moscow is genuinely worried about the powerful transmitters the Chinese set up in Tirana to "broadcast Mao's preachers in all languages to the world."

Maoist subversion

Nearly 20 Communist splinter parties loyal to Peking were represented at the Albanian party congress in November, 1966. Also present were delegations from North Korea, North Vietnam, and Romania.

The various pro-Chinese opposition groups operating inside the Soviet bloc have representatives in Tirana and use Albanian communications facilities to reach their adherents at home.

At a time when Moscow calls for unity and discipline in the Communist movement, the Soviets are bound to take a serious view of the existence of a center of Maoist subversion on the flank of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe.

As Peking seeks to strengthen its position on the Soviet Union's western flank, Moscow apparently has had second thoughts about North Korea. Strategically located between the Soviet Far East and China, North Korea so far has relied mainly on Soviet economic and military aid.

But China has one foot in the door. Only three weeks ago Premier Chou Enlai visited Pyongyang.

In order to offset possible Chinese encroachments, the Soviets in the second half of April sent a military delegation to North Korea, headed by the chief of the general staff.

North Korea allocates nearly one-third of its budget to military expenditures. Marshal Zakharov may have offered additional deliveries of sophisticated equipment at easy terms.

While it is doubtful whether Moscow could make North Korea an ally in the event of a conflict with China, Pyongyang's friendly neutrality would be important for the Soviets.

Seen from Peking, Marshal Zakharov's visit had ominous overtones.

Question: This article seems to imply that the Communist world is not a unitary bloc. What effects should this information have on Nixon's view of the threat of communism?

Excerpt from a speech by Lin Piao, Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, September 3, 1965, quoted in Peking Review, No. 36, September 3, 1965, pp. 9-36.

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"In order to make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to a policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country, and prepare to carry on the fight independently, even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of revolutions in one's own country and does not rely on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid -- even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution -- no victory can be won, or consolidated even if it is won."

Excerpts from the speech, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," by Lin Piao, September 1965:

"The peoples subjected to its (U.S.) aggression are having a trial of strength with U.S. imperialism neither in Washington or New York, neither in Honolulu or Florida but are fighting for independence and freedom on their own soil. Once they are mobilized on a broad scale, they will have inexhaustible strength. Thus superiority will belong not to the U.S. but to the peoples subjected to its aggression. The latter though apparently weak and small, are really more powerful than U.S. imperialism."

"We have always held that the internal affairs of each country should be settled by its own people. The relations between all parties big or small, must be built on the principles of equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs."

China Policy Study Group, London, February 1970

"China, convinced as she is of the need and inevitability of fundamental social change, has expressly stated that such change grows out of the local conditions of given societies and cannot be 'exported' or directed from outside. Indeed to believe otherwise would be to underestimate the capacity of the masses to bring about revolutionary change."

What do you think Lin Piao is saying in his speech?

Given these excerpts of the speech by Lin Piao, Communist China's National Defense Minister, what differences do you see between the approaches of the Chinese and Americans to 'wars of liberation'?

Why are there no Soviet or Chinese troops in Indochina?

Should we fight communism in Indochina if it is supported by the people, e.g., the Vietnamese or Cambodians, and is not imposed by other communist countries?

Cambodian Units Try to Flush Elusive Viet Cong Foe, by Daniel Southerland

The "war" is creeping closer to this important crossing on the Mekong River, located only 30 miles southeast of Phnom Penh. The ferry here links Phnom Penh with the two rice-growing provinces of Prey Veng and Svay Rieng.

It is not a big war yet. Reports of the Viet Cong's moving in massive columns are simply not true and are uncharacteristic of the way the Viet Cong normally operate.

The Viet Cong are moving only in very small bands, but they are not far away. Cambodian officers say there are small groups of them only a few miles to the north as well as to the south of here.

Their harassing attacks and hit-and-run raids have been intimidating enough to force the government to withdraw from most of the territory directly south of here along the banks of the Mekong.

South of here Viet Cong have been firing at Cambodian Navy gunboats. The gunboats retaliated the other day by shelling a village where the Viet Cong were believed to have holed up in a Roman Catholic church.

Food Provided Viet Cong

Vietnamese living near the ferry crossing on the Mekong's west bank had been helping the Viet Cong by providing food, supplies, and recruits for a long time, Captain Sidim said. According to the captain, the Viet Cong transported the food and supplies down the river toward the South Vietnamese border in small boats.

"All the Vietnamese in this area are supporting the Viet Cong," he said.

On the other side of the river, however, we met a Cambodian Army colonel who seemed confident that his troops could protect the ferry crossing.

The colonel said he was forming a 2,000-man brigade whose main function would be to protect the ferry and the area around it.

Many of the men in the new brigade were to be new recruits, and we could see them moving down a road near the colonel's fort in buses, Pepsi-Cola trucks, and beer trucks that had been requisitioned by the Army. The recruits waved and cheered gayly as though it were all a lark.

Contact limited

"We have had no significant contact with the Viet Cong yet," said the colonel, who spoke excellent French. "They are operating in small groups. They are trying to intimidate us."

The colonel said he knew the tactics of the Viet Cong well from his earlier experience fighting the Viet Minh in the Indo-China war.

"We know them as well as we know our own dogs," he said. "We are sure to be able to defend the ferry if they try to attack it," the colonel said.

...
The Guardian, May 9, 1970, pp. 1, 20.

Cambodians Gaining New Ground, by Wilfred Burchett (Peking, China, May 5)

Despite the American-Saigon invasion of eastern Cambodia last week, ostensibly launched to crush alleged Vietnamese military sanctuaries, the Cambodian liberation army now controls most of the countryside of this Southeast Asian nation of 6.6 million people.

All seven roads and two railroads leading to and from the capital of Phnom Penh have been cut by forces of the National United Front. Route 1--the main highway linking Phnom Penh to Saigon in neighboring South Vietnam--was made inoperable May 4 when the liberation army advanced on the town of Neak Luong, 29 miles southeast of the capital.

The rightist regime of dictator Gen. Lon Nol, which assumed power in a CIA-backed coup in March while head of state Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Europe, is making frenzied preparations to defend the capital. Some 2000 CIA-financed and Green Beret-trained Cambodian mercenaries fighting against the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam were flown into Phnom Penh May 2 to defend the regime.

The invasion of U. S. and Saigon troops to the east has not stemmed the liberation tide, despite widespread havoc perpetrated upon the civilian population in the border areas where "vietcong sanctuaries" are supposed to be found. U. S. bombing planes are ruthlessly wiping out village after village under the same "kill all, burn all" mandate that obtains in South Vietnam.

President Nixon's pretext for the invasion--to destroy Vietnamese base camps said to be threatening U. S. troops in South Vietnam--is an incredible distortion of reality proven every day as the invaders report no luck in finding the masses of PRG soldiers or headquarters of the PRG command he said were located along the border.

The Parrot's Beak and Fishhook areas which Nixon said were entirely occupied and controlled by troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) is a densely populated rice-growing country. The International Control Commission, which was set up to supervise implementation of the Geneva Accords, has investigated these regions many times and has not reported finding "Vietcong sanctuaries."

The "Vietcong" and "North Vietnamese" body counts being reported by the U. S. command are the bodies of Cambodian peasants slaughtered in the reign of military terror ordered by Washington. Likewise, the forces which are isolating Phnom Penh and making gains throughout the country are Cambodian, not Vietnamese. And Gen. Creighton Abrams, U. S. commander, well knows--if Nixon does not, which is hardly likely--that the central office of the PRG and National Liberation Front (NLF) is located on Vietnamese, not Cambodian soil.

Nixon announced the "U. S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia in a televised address to the American people the evening of April 30 less than two weeks after he declared the U. S. would withdraw some 150,000 more troops from Vietnam within the next year, leaving a force of over a quarter-million to fight alongside the Saigon army.

Justifying the invasion--which he termed not an invasion at all but an attempt to bring peace to Southeast Asia--Nixon said he was impelled to action because "I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000." He charged that the DRV had been invading Cambodia in the last two weeks, a preposterous allegation.

In a news dispatch from Godauha, South Vietnam, May 1, buried in the New-York Times, "experienced observers both in and outside the American armed forces" were reported as "voicing puzzlement over President Nixon's statement last night that American troops near the Cambodian border have been endangered by action of enemy troops in Cambodia within the last 10 days. After a flareup, termed a periodic 'high point,' in early April, enemy activity has slacked off, the observers say. Before the (invasion) military analysts of background briefings said the pace of the war had settled back to a low level. . . ."

"This is not an invasion of Cambodia," the President continued. "The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw."

These articles suggest two views of the amount of communist activity in Cambodia before American intervention. The first suggests there were only small bands of Viet Cong present in Cambodia. The second suggests there were no Viet Cong in Cambodia and that the United States was really fighting Cambodians.

(1) Was there enough evidence that the Viet Cong were really a threat to Cambodia? To the United States?

(2) If the fighting in Cambodia is between internal factions, one of which may favor a communist form of government, is the United States justified in intervening in that country's civil war?

A Cambodian View by Van Nol, Cambodian Student, Cambridge

I cannot believe the hypocrisy of the American White House when it says "North Vietnam is violating the 1954 Geneva Accords." The entire Vietnam situation since 1956 has been a United States violation of the Geneva Accords.

The Geneva Accords stated that "the line at the 17th Parallel is purely provisional and does not indicate a political division," the line was drawn chiefly to facilitate French evacuation. "North" and "South Vietnam" are not once mentioned in the document. The "Republic of South Vietnam" is an artificial, illegal United States creation.

The Geneva Accords called for elections in 1956 to decide on reunification. It was clear that Ho would win, so United States said "no elections."

The Geneva Accords stipulated that foreign bases and troops in Vietnam are prohibited. The United States violated that stipulation.

Vietnam is one country, any Asian knows this. But the U. S. government has insisted that "North Vietnam" is a foreign country "Infiltrating the South." Were the Confederate states a "foreign country" being "infiltrated from the North?"

I came to America in 1963. I had many illusions about American benevolence. Since then I have seen Presidents escalate lies for power. I have read about United States planes destroying one Asian country after another. My country may be next. I have read about the CIA-trained Meo Army, the "No Prisoners" (e.i.--shoot them policy in Vietnam. I have heard how G.I.'s put Viet Cong ears on their radio antennae. I know that they kill women and children for sport (See Harper's, May). It makes the Communists' violence seem mild indeed.

And now I have heard Nixon insist that South Vietnam must remain South Vietnam and I heard him lie, lie, lie.

I shall return to my country this August--assuming it still exists then, I am extremely grateful to the fine universities which trained and supported me. I have had good teachers, made some good friends, but I also know of professors who planned this war, and I have heard Nixon apply double standards on Geneva.

When I go home I am going to write articles. I am going to tell all my friends and countrymen never to put any trust in the Nixon-Pentagon government.

I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly, March 23, 1970

The Cost of U. S. Aid

"We could have had the billions of American dollars you see spent in Saigon, the skyscrapers and the traffic jams of Bangkok and the low-cost imported luxuries of Vientiane, if we had wished," said one government official recently. "But we also would have had, like those countries, American planes bombing our countryside, our cities filled with unemployed youths, a communist insurrection all around us, galloping inflation and an enormous trade deficit." --From Cambodia in the Washington Post, March 14

Questions: Do the Cambodians share the American fear of communism?
Which is a greater threat to Cambodians--American or Viet Cong presence?

Observer: This Very Final Kind of Game, by Russell Baker

Washington! May 11--President Nixon says he is not going to be the first President to lose a war. Before him President Johnson said the same. This is sports talk. Easy to make fun of, but not so easily disposed of because the notion of war as the ultimate game is a big piece of mental luggage in Atlantic society.

The British have that old canard about Waterloo being won on the playing fields of Eton, which prettifies the reality of Wellington's army--press-ganged proletarians, in fact. The Prussians. Well, we know about the Prussians with their magnificent planning for the big game. Those railroad timetables. Beautifully diagramed movements on wall maps. Sort of three-dimensional parchesi for big boys.

In the film, "Patton," George C. Scott as the general of the title makes a persuasive statement of the case: Americans like to win. Football or war. And so we do.

When Presidents begin talking about being the first to lose a war, there is no reason to think they are kidding us, even when the opponent is so lightweight and underequipped as North Vietnam in coalition with the Vietcong.

It is altogether reasonable to assume that when Presidents talk this way they are feeling the heat, just as the coach of a successful collegiate football mill feels the heat from the alumni when he fields a defeatable team.

In the metaphor of war as sport, President Nixon assumes the role of coach. The United States becomes a team. The Yanks, perhaps. No. The Americans. United States Americans.

The American Team

Now, the Americans are some kind of team, as the sports writers might say. They make the old Green Bay Packers, Vince Lombardi's team, and Ohio State University look seconderate in the comparison.

There hasn't been a team like the Americans since Frank Merriwell attended Yale. Because the Americans can say with reasonable accuracy that they have never lost a game (war). There may have been a couple of stand-offs, but there are no defeats on the record.

After upsetting the Redcoats in the opener and battling them to a stand-still in the return engagement (1812), they went on to trounce the Mexicans, massacre the Redskins, K.O. the Spanish, score two decisive victories over the Germans ("Kraute routed"; "Nazis crushed") and pulverize the Japanese.

The Civil War in the middle of this long season is a problem. It is really very difficult to think of that as a game. It was too much like--well, like war. All that liberation happening right in one's own bean patch doesn't seem very much like sport, but then it's been so long ago. . . .

Anyhow, there was that odd contest with the People's Republic of North Korea. Bush leaguers, to be frank about it. It should have amounted to nothing more than an exhibition, a light sweat. Then the Chinese pouring onto the field with those awful bugles.

Coach Truman infuriated the fans and alumni by refusing to put in the first team. Coach Truman said, though not in so many words of course, that he was

not a coach but President of the United States, and that war was not sport at all.

The Americans gave an excellent account of themselves in Korea finally, and there was a negotiated settlement. Though many persons were angry about the President's failure to treat the war as sport, no one suggested at the time that the Americans had been defeated.

The idea that the United States, capable of the final human wipe-out, could possibly lose to the Republic of North Korea, even supported by the Chinese Communist infantry, was too patently nonsensical.

The idea that it can lose to North Vietnam and the Viet-cong is even sillier. Surely there is just no way that much power can be whipped by infantry and guerrillas. It is doubtful that President Johnson ever believed it, or that President Nixon believes it now.

The Sporting Habit

What the President fears is the wrath of a public fallen into the habit of viewing war as sport. In sport, games are won or lost--in sudden-death overtime if necessary. A game unwon is a lost game, a blot on the team's record, a threat to their No. 1 ranking in the Associated Press poll.

This is not fancy. The President's men use a different metaphor, of course; they do not talk about sport but about the danger of upheaval from the right (the fans and alumni) if this war (game) should not seem to be won. The problem for President Nixon is to quit playing football without enraging fans and alumni. To tell them that war is not the least bit like the Super Bowl.

Le Monde. Weekly Selection April 30 - May 6, 1970, translated from the French.

"The Law of the Strongest"

The author, Le Monde's official Washington correspondent, comments on President Nixon's speech of April 30, 1970. Clement is struck by two elements in this speech: the continuity of themes constantly reiterated by preceding administrations for twenty years to sanctify the capriciousness of "the richest and strongest nation in human history"; and a new element -- the absence of any attempt to justify the Cambodian invasion by invoking the national interests of Cambodia. Clement seems to feel that this new use of undisguised brute force -- an acceptance of the notion that might makes right -- is partly born of the atmosphere of profound pessimism in administration circles and an increasing desperation following a long series of small defeats.

There are many details of Nixon's speech worthy of discussion but one should confine oneself to two points that seem essential to any future analysis because they are closely interrelated. First, one notes that the President invoked no national or legal case to cover up the "clean-up" of Cambodian sanctuaries. Officially, at least, the government of Phnom-Penh did not request this type of help that calmly proceeds to violate the neutrality it proclaimed just a few days ago. The high-handedness of the American intervention shocked even the Cambodian representatives in the opposition to Prince Sihanouk. The United States took in hand, or rather under their bombs and their boots the "occupied regions" of Cambodia because, as President Nixon has never ceased repeating to his television audience, it saw here a unique chance to strike a decisive blow at its enemies and to achieve what it henceforth terms with no false shame, a "victory". The quibbles of the previous administration, the sermons in international morality delivered untiringly by Dean Rusk, belong to another epoch -- that of "doleful diplomatic protest" for which Mr. Nixon feels only derision and scorn. Washington is exercising the law of the strongest on the neighbor of its allies without referring to the slightest text or pretext.

This attitude is so contrary to the American legalistic tradition that one must ask what might have occasioned this break. It is uncertain whether Mr. Nixon himself is fully aware of its extent, although he certainly is not minimizing the risks involved. Yet one has only to hear the word "anarchy" mentioned two or three times to know what is going on. For him, we are living "in a century of anarchy"; respect becomes irrelevant. To restore the American prestige essential to the balance of the world one must prove that Washington will not retreat before the challenge of violence and the scruples of conscience. It is necessary to fight fire with fire and to threaten to go even further if necessary,

as Mr. Nixon himself declared without the slightest embarrassment as he scattered calls for order and admonitions such as allusions to the possibility of a new escalation on the Indochinese front and even others.

One will think what one wishes of this kind of logic, but one would do well to note that here are found two of the strangest streams of current thought: the eternal utopianism of the military who are constantly "just on the point of..." and who finally have their "hands free" to "get" as many "Viets" as they want, and the profound pessimism that permeates the Republican administration concerning the "Decline of the West". Since it is doubtful that this pessimism stems from a reading of the great English pessimists, it would seem fair to attribute it to the numerous defeats, even those disguised in success, undergone by the administration.

Clement says it was American pride and not an immediate military threat that led to the Cambodian intervention. Should we invade another country just to avoid embarrassment? Does not winning necessarily entail weakness?

Foreign policy always has impact at home as well as abroad. Sometimes, as in the case of Vietnam, foreign policy can divide a nation, but at other times and in other places, such as in the Middle East, foreign policy can be a force for national unity. Foreign policy does not affect public opinion alone; it should also be remembered that money that goes to the pursuit of some goal abroad is money that is not available for spending for the benefit of the people at home. A foreign policy that is both very expensive and very unpopular can lead to serious trouble at home. The survival of the United States means more than protection of our traditions of majority rule and minority rights and our freedom to speak out, alone or with others, about the things that concern us. All groups must feel at home in our country because all groups must live here. If some groups feel that their interests are not being considered in the making of decisions that affect everyone, then the survival of the country as we know it is threatened.

Why did the President's announcement of the move into Cambodia touch off such a sharp response? Do you think he knew that so many people would be opposed? Do you think he would have made the decision if he had known what the response was going to be? Do you think he has decided that the mood of the country can safely be ignored until his diplomatic and military concerns are out of the way? Do you think we are approaching the point that internal trouble is a greater threat to the continued existence of democracy as the Communist bloc?

Nixon: He Faces a Divided, "Anguished Nation"

WASHINGTON -- America was a nation in anguish last week, her population divided, her campuses closed, her capital shaken, her Government confused, her President perplexed.

The lines of conflict ran zigzag across the land. There was the visible line of National Guardsmen firing blindly into a crowd of students at Kent, Ohio -- "one set of kids against another," in the words of the father of one of the four who fell dead. And there was the invisible line of dissent and distress running right through the President's official family -- "Permit me to suggest that you consider meeting on an individual and conversation basis with members of your Cabinet," wrote Walter J. Hickel, the Secretary of the Interior, to the President.

Only six months after he had rallied a great "silent majority" to his support on the war in Vietnam, against inflation and against crime, Richard Nixon was bidding frantically for peace with a rebellious minority that challenged not only his policies but also his qualities of leadership and understanding of his people.

Only one week after he had boldly ordered American troops into Cambodia and furtively resumed the bombing of North Vietnam, the President had canceled the air raids and circumscribed the ground action in ways that suggested the very opposite of the strength he had meant to display.

Effects of Crises

So the crises that were Cambodia and Kent inflamed not only the campuses and distant battlefield. They send tremors of fear through the White House that revolt and repression might be nearer than anyone had dared to imagine. They brought home, at least to most of the President's advisers, the realization that the national security was endangered by much, much more than the Vietcong or Communists.

"I think school has made me hard," said Mimi Bertucci, a friend of one of the slain students in Ohio. "Bobby Kennedy's death marked the turning point in our lives -- and now this. This means all hope is off. What's the use? I feel frustrated. I feel, what can we do? What kind of democracy is this?"

And speaking to some of the students who massed in protest in Washington yesterday, and who asked him whether Vice President Agnew's "rhetoric" had contributed to the deaths at Kent, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert H. Finch replied: "It contributed to heating up the climate in which the Kent State students were killed." But he added later that he meant in no way to suggest the Vice President had contributed to the tragedy itself.

For all the commotion thus inspired, however, there was no telling the real reaction of President Nixon. He began the fateful week at the Pentagon, symbolically enough, denouncing some campus radicals as "bums." The White House proudly mimeographed that comment, as if in support of all the more polysyllabic insults previously hurled at the young by Vice President Agnew.

And then, in tragic counterpoint, came Kent, a symbolic rendering of alienated, angry young Americans being overcome by armed and frightened young Americans. Completing the metaphor, President Nixon bemoaned the event with a comment that almost said I told you so -- "When dissent turns to violence,

it invites tragedy."

The President had counted on opposition to his move into Cambodia and on a spring renaissance of protest on the campus; and until this moment he and his aides were still determined to ride it out and to gather up the piles of telegrams from television land as evidence of their high standing in most of the land. The short-term exercise in escalation, after all, was supposed to insure the longer-term withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and by summertime, certainly by election time, all this shrewd calculation would be self-evident and the power, resolve, character and toughness of the United States and its President would have been demonstrated before all the world.

Cabinet Misgivings

Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird had had their misgivings -- at least they did not find the move into Cambodia as "indispensable," no matter how tempting or useful militarily. They had worried about the reaction in Congress, whose sensibilities they had both learned to respect. They worried about the credibility of their Administration at home and abroad.

But no one seems to have counted on the depth of the despair that swept Congress and campus both, and to the dismay of Mr. Nixon's official family, few were even asked.

He had acted essentially on his own, out of his own sense of challenge in Southeast Asia as well as the Middle East, and with his own, lonely determination of what his people would support and what his enemies could be forced to accept and respect.

Mr. Nixon came to the end of last week contending -- at a Friday 10 P.M. news conference -- that he was in no way surprised by the intensity of the protest, only by the widespread misunderstanding of his objectives. He moved into Cambodia to hasten the end of the war, he insisted, and thus he really shared the objectives of his critics.

Nervous, bland but in no way apologetic and obviously resenting the need to justify himself in living color, the President urged that while the action was hot the rhetoric remain cool, cited his own tolerance of dissent as an example of the "safety valves" that are at work to protect American society from revolution or repression, and hastily created a new phalanx of formal and informal advisers to instruct him in the mood of young America and to remind him to stay in touch.

The Boston Globe, May 6, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

I believe this administration finds itself, today, embracing a philosophy which appears to lack appropriate concern for the attitude of a great mass of Americans-our young people.

Addressed either politically or philosophically, I believe we are in error if we set out consciously to alienate those who could be our friends.

Today, our young people, or at least a vast segment of them, believe they have no opportunity to communicate with government, regardless of administration, other than through violent confrontation. But I am convinced we-and they-have the capacity, if we will but have the willingness, to learn from history.

During the great depression, our youth lost their ability to communicate with the Republican Party. And we saw the young people of the 1930's became the predominant leaders of the 40's and 50's-associated not with our party, but rather with those with whom they felt they could communicate.

What is happening today is not unrelated to what happened in the 30's. Now being unable to communicate with either party, they are apparently heading down the road to anarchy. And regardless of how I, or any American, might feel individually, we have an obligation as leaders to communicate with our youth and listen to their ideas and problems.

About 200 years ago there was emerging a great nation in the British Empire, and it found itself with a colony in violent protest by its youth-men such as Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Madison and Munroe, to name a few. Their protests fell on deaf ears, and finally led to war. The outcome is history. My point is, if we read history, it clearly shows that in its protest must be heard.

Let us give America an optimistic outlook and optimistic leadership. Let us show them we can solve our problems in an enlightened and positive manner.

As an example, last December 16, I wrote to you suggesting that April 22, Earth Day, be declared a national holiday. Believing this would have been a good decision, we were active on university campuses over the Christmas holidays with a program called SCOPE (Student Councils on Pollution and the Environment). It was moderately successful, and it showed that it was possible to communicate with the youth.

I am gratified that on April 22, I, and approximately 1,000 Interior employees, participated in Earth Day commemorative activities all over the United States.

I felt, after these meetings, that we had crossed a bridge; that communication was possible and acceptable. Likewise, I suggest in this same vein that you meet with college presidents to talk about the very situation that is erupting, because before we can face and conquer our enemies, we must identify them, whether those enemies take physical or philosophical form. And we must

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Secretary Hickel's letter cont'd

win over our philosophical enemies by convincing them of the wisdom of the path we have chosen, rather than ignoring the path they propose.

In this regard, I believe the Vice President initially has answered a deepseated mood of America in his public statements. However, a continued attack on the young-not on their attitudes so much as their motives-can serve little purpose other than to further cement those attitudes to a solidity impossible to penetrate with reason.

Finally, Mr. President, permit me to suggest that you consider meeting, on an individual and conversational basis, with members of your Cabinet. Perhaps through such conversations, we can gain greater insight into the problems confronting us all, and most important, into the solution of these problems.

Faithfully yours,
Wally
Walter J. Hickel

Secretary of the Interior

New York Times, May 10, 1970

Then, in a highly unusual move, Mr. Nixon suddenly decided at dawn yesterday to go to the Lincoln Memorial to "rap" with some of the students gathered there. "Go shout your slogans on the Ellipse, "the site of the principal rally near the White House, the President told the surprised students. "Just keep it peaceful."

But there were many men around the President, of whom Secretary Hickel became only a sudden symbol, who felt that Mr. Nixon had been the most guilty of misunderstanding the mood of the nation. Cabinet members and aides spoke of him as arithmetically political and administratively mechanical, but as lacking in "antennae" to catch the real currents of opinion and lacking in imagination to place himself truly in the vanguard of idealism.

The President tried to defuse the criticism by pledging to the members of Congress and finally to the country that American troops would be out of Cambodia by the end of June, that they would not become embroiled in the defense of Cambodia herself and that his only purpose was to speed up the withdrawal of Americans from the war.

But there was tension inside of him. He was under attack, he noted, even though he had spoken up vigorously for men like Secretary Hickel when they were under attack. The effort to divide him from his Vice President was an "old game," he remarked knowingly. He wasn't going to fall for that by muzzling anyone. "Bums" was not meant as a slur on all dissenters, but wasn't it really too kind for those who burned books and building and terrorized the campus? There was nothing he had done or failed to do, he implied, that justified such a fuss.

Yet the fuss continued. Construction workers tried to beat up student marchers. Students vowed to move from campus capers to Congressional politics. National Guardsmen bayoneted demonstrators. For one brief moment, at least, the granite facade of government itself cracked wide open and officials let show their resentment of the war, their despair with the isolation of the President, their sense of muddling through without purpose.

What had been a confident and even giddy Administration became suddenly introspective and skeptical, drawn closer to the demonstrators outside its portals. Those who had been shoved aside by efficient planners of war and calculating advocates of law and order suddenly felt entitled to speak up again and demand at least equal time from the President.

They hoped that he would hear them, if not also those beyond.

The Economic Costs and Benefits of War:

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TO THE TEACHER:

The economic arguments are more difficult for high school students without a background in basic economic theory to understand than are the other arguments presented here. We have provided you with a set of materials, and we leave it up to you to decide what your students would benefit from reading.

The economic questions involved in the Vietnam war and its extension into Cambodia concern problems of costs and of benefits. The costs include the following: inflation, higher taxes, resources not available for domestic programs. The benefits to some parts of the American business community include: jobs and profits in the defense industry, control of necessary raw materials and cheap labor abroad, control of future markets for consumer goods abroad.

There are three articles which we have clipped from publications: Thurow discusses the costs of the war, Lundborg evaluates the negative impact of the war on American business, and Gilbarg discusses how much business gains from the war. We have also included excerpts from an unpublished article by a committee of students and faculty of the Department of Economics at Harvard University. It summarizes the effects of the war on the domestic economy and suggests a relationship between anti-communism and business interests.

The following are some of the questions the class might discuss in relation to the economic arguments:

1. Make a list of all the ways the war is costing you money, goods or services.
2. Which groups in society are losing most because of the cost of this war? Which groups stand to gain from the war?
3. What are the reasons that working people are suffering from the economic impact of the war?
4. Why might some businessmen want Nixon to pursue the fighting until the U.S. wins?
5. According to these articles, more people are being hurt than helped by the war. Why do you think that American foreign policy is serving the interests of the small but powerful group who want the war to continue?
6. If you were a businessman and you were profiting from the war, would you think that your profits were a good enough reason to keep the war going?

The \$140 billion that will have been spent on the war in Viet Nam by the end of President Nixon's current budget represents the primary economic effect of the war. Every man, woman and child in America is approximately \$700 poorer as a result. Instead of being used to solve most, if not all, of our country's pressing social problems, these resources have been wasted. As long as the war continues, economic resources will not be available to attack any other social problems. If the Nixon policies of curing inflation by creating higher unemployment are successful, another \$30 billion in economic resources will be lost because men and machines will be idle when they could have been producing goods and services.

In addition to the direct effects of Viet Nam, there are a host of indirect effects -- inflation, high interest rates, housing shortages, falling stock prices, balance of payments crises, and increasing financial pressures on small business. The indirect effects of Viet Nam spring not from the war itself, but from the efforts of the Johnson administration to face up to the scope of the war.

The war could have been fought without indirect effects, but to do so would have required raising taxes just as rapidly as military expenditures rose or imposing wage and price controls. Both of these measures were deliberately rejected by the Nixon and Johnson administrations since they would have directly confronted each American with the economic realities of the war in Viet Nam. Both Presidents were unwilling to tell the American public the costs of the war in Viet Nam. They did not and are not letting the American public fulfill its democratic function of determining whether the costs are justifiable. By the end of his administration, President Johnson was preparing estimates of the cost of the war in Viet Nam, but the Nixon administration has reverted to the policy of not publishing this information in its current budget.

High interest rates and the concomitant lack of credit lead to large reductions in the construction of new homes, but not to reductions in purchases of other consumption goods. Thus housing is reduced while luxuries are unaffected. The result is rapid increases in rents and housing prices as a larger and larger population competes for a fixed stock of housing. In the four years prior to Viet Nam, rents rose 4 per cent and in the 4 years since Viet Nam rents have risen 9 per cent. Since housing claims a much larger fraction of the budgets of the poor than of the rich, the impact of rising rents is particularly severe on those with the least income.

In periods of high interest rates, financial institutions ration credit to their customers. What this means in practice is that small business cannot get credit, even if they are willing and able to pay high interest rates while large businesses are still able to expand because they are the preferred customers in the financial markets. The result is increasing pressures towards concentration of economic resources in the hands of the few.

While the effects of high interest rates on housing and small business were known and expected by government planners, the effects on the stock market were completely unexpected. If it had been expected, Johnson's policymakers might have carried out a different mix of fiscal and monetary

(continued)

(Thurow continued)

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policies. This impact can be seen in the rhetorical efforts of the Nixon administration to tighten fiscal policies so that interest rates can be lowered. In the short-run, the major impact of this policy will be to raise stock prices if the policy were actually to be successful.

There are only two methods to reduce inflation -- impose wage and price controls or create a recessionary period with much higher unemployment. In the first case, everyone must help pay the costs of stopping inflation and in the second case, only those who lose their jobs or who must shift to shorter working hours pay the costs of stopping inflation. The current strategy of the Nixon administration is to impose the burden of stopping inflation on those who lose their jobs in a recession. In effect, the poor are to be held responsible for the past errors of Federal policymakers who are not about to lose their means of livelihood.

Economically, the frightening aspects of President Nixon's conduct of the Vietnamese war is the reversion to the worst aspects of President Johnson's conduct of the war and some additional errors of their own. (1) Military expenditures on Vietnam which were once kept secret, and then made public, are once again to be kept secret. (2) Economic planning in the current Nixon budget is based on the assumption that the Vietnamese War will end rapidly just as it was in the 1967 budget of President Johnson. In neither case is there any justification for such an assumption. (3) Public rhetoric notwithstanding, the surplus in the federal budget is to fall from 1969 to 1970, leading to easier and not tighter fiscal policies. The result will be more pressures on interest rates than would have been the case if the surpluses of 1969 (the last Johnson budget) were carried forward into 1970 (the first Nixon budget). (4) Wage and price guideposts which were rudimentary in the past are to be discarded in the future. (5) High interest rates and inflation are to continue, but with the added uncertainty of a possible recession and high unemployment as well.

Louis B. Lundborg, Chairman of the Board, Bank of America, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 15, 1970, (abr.), quoted in I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly, May 4, 1970

Despite the protestations of the New Left, the fact is that an end to the war would be good, not bad, for American business. In the middle of 1964 when the Vietnam escalation began, the economy was in quite good shape. We had at that time an uninterrupted economic advance of 52 months -- a peacetime record -- unemployment averaged 4½ percent, the consumer price index had increased only 1.2 percent during the first 6 months of 1965, and the average operating rate of industrial capacity was at 90 percent.

The Vietnam war has not been good for business profits. During the four years prior to the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, corporate profits after taxes rose 71.0 percent. From 1966 through 1969 corporate profits after taxes rose only 9.2 percent.

It is important to comment briefly on what has happened to the U.S. balance of payments. The best measure of what happened to the long run position is the balance on current account. This balance declined from a surplus of \$7.8 billion in 1964 to about \$4 billion in 1967 and \$1.4 billion in 1968 and less than \$1 billion in 1969. A good part of the progressive deterioration of this position over the years since 1964, the year before the major escalation of the Vietnam war, may be accounted for by the large increase in foreign exchange outflows associated with military expenditures. These rose from less than \$3 billion in 1964 to nearly \$5 billion in 1969.

In the five-year period prior to the Vietnam escalation, defense spending in the United States averaged \$50 billion per year. If we assume that this level would have been maintained over the most recent five-year period in the absence of escalation, the increase in actual spending totaled \$118 billion. During the past four years, total spending for residential construction in the United States totaled only \$112 billion. When we survey the very real needs in our economy in the areas of housing, urban transit, environmental pollution, etc., it is clearly evident that we do not need to create war-related demand for resources in order to maintain full employment.

The Cost of the War to the American People
How Much? Who Pays?

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The Graduate Economic Club, Harvard University

Hundreds of thousands of people have paid for this war with their lives. Hundreds of thousands of others have paid with their maimed limbs, lost eyesight, and other crippling if not mortal wounds. Those that have suffered most have, of course, been the people of Southeast Asia -- poor people, peasants, and workers. In addition, over 40,000 Americans have died. And who are the American dead and wounded? Poor people -- black, brown, and white -- are represented in the American death rolls of Southeast Asia in extravagant proportion to their numbers in our society.¹

The economic costs of the war cannot be compared with these human costs. But they can be measured in dollars and cents, in months of labor wasted, and in the further postponement of needed social programs in the fields of housing, health, education, welfare, and pollution control.

By the end of the current budget year, the United States will have spent over \$140 billion on the war.² This is \$3800 worth of destruction per man, woman, and child in Vietnam (both North and South) in a country where the per capita gross national product was only \$110 in 1967.

The Economic Cost: Lost Output, Wasted Labor

The \$140 billion spent in the war against the people of Indochina represents a cost of \$2800 to every family in the U.S.³ These costs do not include the economic burden of the draft, which is borne disproportionately by working people, and which forces young people to work at subsistence army wages rather than taking home a normal paycheck. Nor does this figure include the hundreds of billions of dollars spent developing the vast military system prepared to fight this kind of war. Put somewhat differently, American working men and women have each labored for an average of over two months -- not to produce useful goods, but to support the war against the people of Indochina.⁵ For the past half decade, each employed person has labored a substantial part of our working year producing goods of no use to ourselves, to support our governments foreign policy. Our economy had the productive capacity to give everyone an extra paid two-week vacation for each year for the past four years -- without reducing the output of civilian goods. These "vacations" were spent producing the goods to destroy Indochina.

But even this staggering personal cost does not capture the full impact of the war. Not only is the government spending billions of dollars worth of what we produce on war, but we are at the same time producing less than we could. During the late '50's and early '60's the rate of growth of output per man-hour averaged 3.2% per year. But during the war years this rate of growth has not continued: the rate was 2.0% in 1967, hit 3.3% in 1968, but fell to only .3% in 1969. While we cannot be sure why the economy has performed so badly during two of the war years, it is likely that the diversion of resources away from productive investments such as manpower training, education, and plant and equipment has been partly responsible.

This year we enter into a period of high unemployment -- consciously planned by the Nixon administration to combat war-induced inflation. Our total supply of goods and services will be impaired not only by forgone opportunities to expand our productive capacity; even existing capacity will not be fully used in 1970. Workers and machines will lie idle for much of

the time. The loss of potential output to the people as a whole will probably reach about \$20 billion in this year alone, or \$400 per family.

Inflation

In part, the slowing down of the economy has been planned. In order to curb inflation the Nixon government has attempted to bring the economy to a grinding halt. What is the connection between the war and inflation?

If a typical consumer spent \$100 a week last year on groceries, rent, and other items, he needs more than \$106 to buy the same items this year. But even though the rate of inflation accelerated at the same time as President Johnson's escalation of the war (late 1965), some have argued that the war is not the cause of the inflation. After all, the war costs only \$30 billion each year out of a gross national product that was \$932 billion in 1969. Why should the war spending be especially inflationary?

One reason is the unpopularity of the war. America's involvement in World War II had the support of the American people. The government imposed wage, price, and credit controls and raised taxes to finance increased military expenditures. But the Johnson-Nixon administrations have faced strong opposition to the war and they have tried to finance the war behind the backs of the American people. They did not go directly to the people and ask them to pay for the war.

Even though the war spending is a small fraction of the gross national product, the small fraction is inflationary because nobody wants to pay for it. In these circumstances, the increase in corporate income taxes enacted in 1968 to help control inflation was not effective. Corporations responded to the surcharge by raising prices. Neither business nor labor was willing to pay for the war and the result was a wage-price spiral.

The fact that the government has chosen inflationary ways rather than major increases in taxation to finance the war does not mean that nobody is paying for the war. The burden of payment has simply been placed most heavily on those least able to protect themselves from inflation -- older people living on savings or fixed income pensions, unemployed workers attempting to support themselves on unemployment compensation, and others.

The inflationary pressures created by the war and the government's attempt to hide it from the American people could have been contained -- as in previous wars -- through direct controls on the economy. But preservation of the support of the war among the business community dictated that price controls not be used.

High Interest Rates

In fact, the ways in which the government has tried to deal with inflation have worsened the economic effects of the war and concentrated the costs on the poor and middle income groups.

In an effort to cut down private demand in the economy, the government has raised interest rates. Higher interest rates make it more expensive to borrow money for either investment or consumption, and thus reduce the demand for goods and services. In periods of high interest rates, financial institutions ration credit to their customers. Small businesses and individuals are often not able to get credit even if they are willing to pay high rates, while large corporations are still able to expand because

of their status as preferred clients of the banks, and because they can use their own revenues as a major source of funds. The result is to increase the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of large corporations.

The construction industry, and housing in particular, has been hardest hit by the high interest rates. The cost of home mortgages has risen from 5 1/2% in December 1965 to 8 1/2% in December 1969. This means that a \$20,000 twenty-year mortgage now costs the homeowner \$35 more per month, in total \$8,800 more than it cost five years ago.

While high interest rates and the control of credit lead to cutbacks in the construction of homes, they have much less effect on the output of other consumption goods. Thus because of the housing shortage, rents -- which are a major item in poor people's budgets -- have gone up (12% in the Boston area over the last 18 months) while luxuries and other goods consumed largely by the rich have been unaffected.

Unemployment

The government's policy of stopping economic growth to fight inflation is having effects throughout the economy. More important than the housing shortage is the rising rate of unemployment. Over a million more workers were out of work in April 1970 than in December 1969. In April 1970, unemployment rose to 4.8%, the fastest monthly rise in 12 years. Blacks were hurt much more than whites. The black jobless rate rose from 7.1% in March to 8.7% in April, a rise three times as great as the rise in the white jobless rate.⁹ If the experience of previous periods of high unemployment is repeated, women and teenagers, as well as blacks, will be especially hard hit.¹⁰ Many people, discouraged by the futile search for jobs, have dropped out of the labor force altogether (and so, are not counted among the unemployed).¹¹ Meanwhile, the real value of weekly unemployment benefits has increased by less than \$5 over the last ten years.¹²

Ordinarily, during wars the U.S. economy has maintained full employment. In fact, over the past forty years full employment has been approached only during wartime, since the government is unable or unwilling to legislate social programs of sufficient size to absorb the surplus productive capacity which exists in times of peace. Periods of full employment during wartime have typically been years of significant progress for black workers and the unskilled. We are faced now in 1970 with a totally new picture: a wartime economy with rapid price increases and widespread unemployment.

To attribute the simultaneous occurrence of inflation and substantial unemployment solely to the war would be a mistake. It may be that the war has simply brought home to the American people the costs of some of the basic structural weaknesses of an economic system characterized by the concentration of irresponsible economic power in monopolized industries and in the government itself.

Wages

Even those fortunate enough to remain at work face a dismal prospect. Workers' average weekly spendable earnings (adjusted for inflation) have fallen since 1965¹³; over the period 1961 to 1965 they rose by over 10%.

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Spendable earnings (that is, gross earnings minus social security and federal income tax payments) for production workers, again adjusted for inflation, were lower in March 1970 than they were in March 1964.^{13/} In part, this was due to the surcharge on personal income tax.

As organized labor has attempted to recoup these losses, the government has intervened in the name of fiscal integrity -- using the National Guard against postal workers in New York, and more recently against the Teamsters in Ohio. The "national interest" has come down like a heavy hand on the freedom of working people to organize and to strike -- in this case not to increase but simply to maintain their share of the pie.

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES

1. See M. Zeitlin, "A Note on Death in Vietnam," in Zeitlin, ed., American Society, Inc. (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 174. "Based on individual data on all 380 servicemen from Wisconsin who died in Vietnam through 1967, we found that 27.6% came from families classified as 'poor' by official standards, in contrast to the comparable cohort figure of 12.4% in the population."
2. The figure of \$140 billion is based on Defense Department accounts indicating an incremental cost of \$110 billion, plus an estimated \$6 billion per year over the past five years taken from the Defense Department funds allocated at pre-Vietnam levels. The figure probably is an underestimate.
3. World Bank Atlas, 1969. The 1967 Census shows total population of 37 million
4. President's Council of Economic Advisers, 1970. There were 50 million families in the U.S. in 1968.
5. Average GNP during the period 1965-1969 was about \$800 billion. \$140 billion represents over two months of annual output.
6. President's Council of Economic Advisers, 1970, p. 216.
7. If we assume that full employment is 98% of the labor force, we will fall short of this nominal rate by at least 3% in 1970. Statistical studies suggest that output will fall by something like .7 of one percent for each percentage fall in total labor employed. (-.03 x 950 billion = approximately \$20 billion loss in output.)
8. Based on the consumer price index published in the President's Council of Economic Advisers' Report, 1970, p. 229.
9. Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1970, p. 3.
10. New York Times, May 9, 1970, based on Department of Labor statistics.
11. President's Council of Economic Advisers' Report, 1970, table C-26.
12. Figures refer to earnings in all private non-agricultural industries in 1957-59 prices. President's Council of Economic Advisers' Report, 1970, p. 21
13. New York Times, April 8, 1970.

During the early period of the war, increasing war expenditures undoubtedly did create jobs and did help to lower the unemployment rate to its low of 3.3% in December, 1968. Will ending the war cause a recession?

The Vietnam War now costs the government roughly \$30 billion per year.¹ After the war, military spending will not fall by the full \$30 billion since some funds will undoubtedly be transferred to other military uses. There is a large backlog of much needed government projects in such areas as housing, health, education, pollution control, and urban development. The new Family Assistance Program will require \$4.4 billion in its first full year of operation.² With proper government expenditure and taxation policies, there is no danger of substantially increased unemployment as a result of the end of the war.

Of course, demobilization will require shifts in employment patterns as soldiers switch to civilian jobs and as defense industries readjust to the new situation. But the magnitude of their readjustment will not be great. In one to two years after the end of the fighting, 600,000 former military personnel will be added to the private labor force and as many as 750,000 civilian workers might be required to shift jobs if defense contracts decline.³ To put these numbers in perspective, we might point out that in the manufacturing sector alone, new workers were hired at an average monthly rate of 730,000 in 1966 and 640,000 in 1967. So although specific problems will undoubtedly occur in certain areas which have prospered solely as a result of defense installations, the demobilization should not present major problems. It has been estimated that the cost of expanding present readjustment programs such as HUD housing loans, employment services, and relocation and veterans' assistance would be less than \$300 million a year.⁴

What the government can do, of course, does not predict what it will do. The end of the war will free the government from budget constraints which currently limit spending on needed social programs. Expansion of these programs would avoid the danger of recession, but recession will also be avoided if military expenditures remain at their present level and are diverted to new military programs. If this occurs, it will give further confirmation to the belief that there is a fundamental weakness in the American system: it maintains affluence through its commitment to military spending.

¹ Committee for Economic Development, The National Economy and the Vietnam War, 1968.

² Economic Report of the President, 1970.

³ Cp. cit., Committee.

⁴ Cp. cit., Economic Report.

Graduate Economics Club, Harvard University

Freedom: Personal, Political, and Economic

Many take this abominable war to be an aberration of American foreign policy. It is not. It is an extreme, but logical, outcome of an Asian, African and Latin American policy that reflects the interests of America's largest corporations, not the interests of the American people.

The cornerstone of that policy is, and has been for twenty-five years at least, anti-communism. Why? As business leaders tell the story, it is political and personal freedom that is at issue; we are the policemen of places as distant as Southeast Asia, or as near as the Dominican Republic, indeed "from the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli" out of concern for the political and personal freedom of the world's millions of black, brown, and yellow inhabitants. The freedom of the American corporation to do business is merely a means to an end, for as the chairman of the board of Texaco so concisely put it last year,

Freedom is not divisible...Only if we safeguard our basic freedom of economic enterprise can we preserve the political and indeed the personal freedom that we all hold so dear.

If the end is political and personal freedom, shouldn't we expect to find business leaders at least as concerned with right-wing coups in Greece and Brazil as with left-wing revolution in Cuba and Vietnam? At least as preoccupied by repression in Spain as by repression in the Soviet Union? Certainly we should. But just try to find a single corporate publication expressing the slightest concern for the victims of right-wing generals. On the contrary, a few hours in any business school library will turn up nothing but praise for Franco and his ilk. Business can hardly contain its enthusiasm for Franco, whose "rich experience" added "fresh dimensions" to Spanish economic development.² Have we already forgotten that Franco's "rich experience" includes wartime aid to Hitler? That Franco sent troops thousands of miles to fight international communism?

Or was it concern for political and personal freedom that in 1964 led International Telephone and Telegraph's board chairman to applaud the overthrow of the elected Brazilian president by right-wing generals:³

Recent events in Brazil have dramatically supported an improving turn of events there, and I draw your attention to the significance of President Johnson's recognition of the new Brazilian government...

No, the concern of big business with "international communism" is genuine enough, but it isn't necessary to look so far afield from normal business pursuits to find the basis of this concern.

¹

Report of the 1969 Annual Meeting of Stockholders of the Texaco Corporation.

² Marathon World, house organ of the Marathon Oil Company, Vol. I, No. 1, Fall 1964.

³ International Telephone and Telegraph, Annual Meeting of Stockholders, 1964.

Excerpts from Daniel Gilbarg, Vietnam, U.S. Imperialism, and Us, 1969

. . . in the postwar years, U.S. foreign investments leaped ahead prodigiously. . . . Specifically, in 1950, 10% of U.S. corporations' (excluding banks) profits were earned off foreign operations. In 1964, this proportion had risen to 22%. Over this period, while domestic profits for those corporations increased by 66%, profits off foreign operations increased 271%. Though somewhat less than half of all U.S. investments and trade is in the underdeveloped world (the rest are in the industrialized capitalist countries, e.g., Europe, Japan), considerably more than half of U.S. profits are derived from interests in the underdeveloped world, because of the higher rate of profit there.

All of this begins to indicate the rapidly growing stake of American business in foreign operations and to explain the nature of its dependence on such operations. But global figures on profits give us only a first approximation. We should also note that the figures given on profits are an average over corporations that have a stake abroad and corporations that don't. If we look at the particular industries and companies that have foreign operations, we find that the dependence of these is far greater than that indicated by the average. Furthermore, we should also remember that even a company that depends on the underdeveloped world for only 2-3% of its profits will be interested in fighting to keep those profits.

Moreover, profits don't tell the whole story. Some corporations have entered foreign markets, which, if not tremendously profitable, still give the corporation a foothold for dominating markets that can be developed in the future or for outcompeting other local or international firms for existing markets. Other corporations in industries requiring particular raw materials for production (e.g., oil, copper) gain concessions to extract those materials in order to gain access to a long-term supply and to prevent competitors from having such access. The largest U.S. oil companies, for example, depend on a monopoly of two thirds of the world's crude oil reserves for their world prominence in the refining and selling of oil. The importance of access to raw materials is brought home all the more sharply by considering that an increasing number of industries now depend on foreign supplies of raw materials and that many of these industries are key to the U.S. military establishment.

The companies with the largest foreign holdings are also the companies which dominate our economy here at home. The eight corporations that together gain 25% of all corporate profits in the United States (General Motors, Ford, AT&T, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Texaco, Gulf, Dupont, IBM) are all heavily committed overseas. This has important implications for the posture of the entire corporate community toward foreign expansion and the need for an aggressive foreign policy to protect economic interests. In particular, these giant corporations have allies throughout the U.S. economy -- suppliers, customers, firms under the same ownership or top-level financial control. Furthermore, there is the overlapping set of interests that directly or indirectly are dependent on military contracts, which are responsible for 15-20% of our entire national product. The military contractors have a clear and obvious interest in an aggressive foreign policy. Taken together, these interests constitute a solid block of the very largest American corporations, deeply committed to preserving and extending the American empire.

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A leading businessman, Henry F. Grady, has said:

'The capitalist system is essentially an international system. If it cannot function internationally, it will break down completely.'

Whether or not the very survival of American capitalism does depend on its economic stake in the underdeveloped countries, there is no question but that a tremendously powerful group of corporate concerns have a great deal at stake in the American Empire. These corporations exercise decisive influence on the policies of the American government. They do so through a whole set of mechanisms that include their importance to the economy, massive campaign contributions sufficient to control both political parties, extensive lobbying, ties to commercially-owned media, and direct representation in the Federal government. As President Woodrow Wilson pointed out in a moment of candor over fifty years ago:

'Suppose you go to Washington and try to get at your Government. You will always find that while you are politely listened to, the men really consulted are the men who have the big stake--the big bankers, the big manufacturers, and the big masters of commerce.... The masters of the Government of the United States are the combined capitalists and manufacturers of the United States.'...

While direct interests in Vietnam are limited (though growing), it offers some considerable opportunities for the future. More importantly, Vietnam is seen as critical to the remainder of the U. S. Empire, and particularly, to Southeast Asia. Henry Cabot Lodge, former Ambassador to South Vietnam and chief negotiator for the United States in Paris, puts it this way:

'He who holds or has influence in Vietnam can affect the future of the Philippines and Formosa to the east, Thailand and Burma with their huge rice surpluses to the west, and Malaysia and Indonesia with their rubber, ore and tin to the south. Vietnam thus does not exist in a geographical vacuum--from its large storehouses of wealth and population can be influenced and undermined.'

The Vice-President of Chase Manhattan Bank in charge of Far Eastern operations chimes in with his concern:

'In the past, foreign investors have been somewhat wary of the over-all political prospect for the region. I must say, though, that the U. S. actions in Vietnam this year--which have demonstrated that the U. S. will continue to give effective protection to the free nations of the region--have

considerably reassured both Asian and Western investors. In fact, I see some reason for hope that the same sort of economic growth may take place in the free economies of Asia that took place in Europe after the Truman Doctrine and after NATO provided a protective shield. The same thing also took place in Japan after the U. S. intervention in Korea removed investor doubts.

... One of the chief ways in which the American government and corporations operate is through local allies. Strong efforts are made to develop local business, landowning, and military elites that can be organized to fight for U. S. economic interests. Local capital is often threatened by the same policies as is U. S. capital (e.g., tax reform, labor laws), and therefore can be mobilized to support U. S. interests. In addition-- and very important--local capital is normally bound to American capital in a whole set of ways that leave it dependent on the American corporations. Investors in manufacturing, for example, often use American brand names, patents, parts, and technologies. In addition, they may share ownership with U. S. capital. Investors in raw materials usually sell to huge U. S. commercial concerns. In general, the largest business interests share much in common with American interests and are sufficiently dependent to support them in all cases. As for the military, its loyalty to the United States is cultivated by lucrative aid, training programs, and advisory help.

...

... It may come as a shock to us that most aid is advanced in the form of loans, not grants. This means that the debtor government must pay the "aid" back, together with the interest on it. Thus, taking loans to support further government spending or to provide more foreign currency only serves to perpetuate the dependency. Soon, the client government must allocate part of its tight budget and foreign exchange requirements to paying back the loans in dollars. Some governments are in the position of having to allocate up to a third of their yearly budgets for the repayment of past loans. The result is simply to create the demand for still further loans....

... More than 85% of U. S. aid comes back to the United States for the purchase of U. S. goods. Most aid programs contain restrictions by which aid money must be used to "buy American." This is the case whether or not a particular item is more expensive in the United States than it is in some other country. In all, 11% of U. S. exports directly result from such foreign "aid."....

... Arnold Toynbee has said:

'America is today the leader of the worldwide anti-revolutionary movement in defense of vested interests.'

She now stands for what Rome stood for. Rome consistently supported the rich against the poor in all foreign communities that fell under her sway; and since the poor, so far, have

always and everywhere been far more numerous than the rich, Rome's policy made for inequality, injustice, and the least happiness of the greatest number.'...

... The desire of the community to control its own resources on behalf of the entire people has meant kicking out U. S. economic interests. The desire of the country for independence has led to repudiation of debt and emphasis on self-reliance in the mobilization of resources rather than reliance on foreign "aid."

Mistaken or Misinformed Hypothesis:

The decision to enter Cambodia is a mistake. This means that the outcomes which we hoped for will not happen; that the cost of that decision might be greater than the gain. Here are possible reasons:

1. There was a lack of information from different sides on which to base the decision. (Refer to the Cuba analogy)
2. Information was available but was badly processed, incorrectly assessed or not used.
3. The rhetoric of "anti-communism" and "victory in Vietnam" has become so common that in order to maintain credibility with the public the government has to continue to act forcibly despite the cost.

TO THE TEACHER:

Before beginning this section we suggest that you discuss with your class the following questions:

1. Whom do you think President Nixon should have consulted before he made the decision to send troops into Cambodia?
Make a list of all the people or groups he could talk to, such as Congress, Cabinet members, the Pentagon, heads of foreign governments (Cambodia, South Vietnam, etc.)
2. Whom do you think the President actually consulted before he made the decision?
3. What advice might each of the groups mentioned give Nixon?

Do you think there would be any disagreements in the advice given by these various groups of people? What? Why?

4. What process ought the President use in making a decision such as the one to send troops into Cambodia?

We have included excerpts from Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days, which describe how President Kennedy made the decision at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. These selections will suggest questions to consider when discussing the way in which Nixon made his Cambodia decision.

Ask students about the following points in the Cuban missile decision:

1. Who did Kennedy talk to?
2. How did Kennedy insure fair representation of all sides of the issue?
3. What viewpoints did the different people and groups consulted represent?
4. How was a decision finally reached?

On Tuesday, October 16, 1962 President Kennedy was informed by the Central Intelligence Agency that American U-2 planes flying over Cuba for "intelligence purposes" had discovered that atomic weapons and surface to surface missiles were being placed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. Although the United States was aware of the military buildup going on in Cuba at the time, "no one had anticipated that the Soviet Union would deliver surface to surface ballistic missiles to Cuba." The news of the Russian missiles in Cuba was especially shocking in light of the fact that only days before Moscow had publicly disavowed "any intention of taking such action," and Premier Krushchev had written a personal letter to Kennedy saying that "under no circumstances would Russian missiles be sent to Cuba."

In the days immediately following the discovery of the Russian missiles, President Kennedy met with a variety of men in all spheres of government in order to reach a decision about what course of action the United States should take in response to the situation. Virtually everyone agreed that there had to be some kind of United States response to the situation. Although a variety of plans were considered by President Kennedy and his advisers, the two main courses of action being debated at this time were: 1. some type of naval blockade or quarantine of Cuba until the missiles were removed; or 2. a surprise air strike against the actual missile sites in Cuba.

From Thirteen Days by Robert Kennedy

The following is an account of the way President Kennedy (in what is usually considered the greatest crisis of his administration) reached a decision on what to do about the missiles. The purpose of the following excerpts is not intended to elicit discussion of the merits of the Kennedy decision, but rather is intended as a basis for discussion on the decision making process-- who was consulted and how the decision was finally made.

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969.

The same group that met that first morning in the Cabinet Room met almost continuously through the next twelve days and almost daily for some six weeks thereafter. Others in the group, which was later to be called the "Ex Comm" (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council), included Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John McCone; Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; President Kennedy's adviser on national-security affairs, McGeorge Bundy; Presidential Counsel Ted Sorensen; Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson; General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Edward Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America; originally, Chip Bohlen, who, after the first day, left to become Ambassador to France and was succeeded by Llewellyn Thompson as the adviser on Russian affairs; Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense; and, intermittently at various meetings, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson; Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador to the United Nations; Ken O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President; and Don Wilson, who was Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency. This was the group that met, talked, argued, and fought together during that crucial period of time. From this group came the recommendations from which President Kennedy was ultimately to select his course of action.

They were men of the highest intelligence, industrious, courageous, and dedicated to their country's well-being. It is no reflection on them that none was consistent in his opinion from the very beginning to the very end. That kind of open, unfettered mind was essential. For some there were only small changes of opinion each day; some, because of the pressure of events, even appeared to lose their judgment and stability.

To keep the discussions from being inhibited and because he did not want to arouse attention, he decided not to attend all the meetings of our committee. This was wise. Personalities change when the President is present, and frequently even strong men make recommendations on the basis of what they believe the President wishes to hear. He instructed our group to come forward with recommendations for one course or possibly several alternative courses of action.

* * *

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in calling for immediate military action.

* * *

General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, summed up everyone's feelings: "You are in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President." The President answered quickly, "You are in it with me." Everyone laughed, and, with no final decision, the meeting adjourned.

* * *

that it should not be undertaken by the U.S. and that it would be better to have a blockade, and moreover, a blockade could be justified.

With some trepidation, I argued that, whatever validity the military and political arguments were for an attack in preference to a blockade, America's traditions and history would not permit such a course of action. Whatever military reasons he and others could marshal, they were nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a surprise attack by a very large nation against a very small one. This, I said, could not be undertaken by the U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home and around the globe.

The President and his advisers were not easily swayed, and so it was decided to go ahead with the military option.

On the following day, the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War met again to discuss the military option.

At 10:30 A.M., the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War met again to consider the military option. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels.

At 10:45 A.M., the President and the Secretary of State again met. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels.

At 10:55 A.M., the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War met again to consider the military option. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels.

At 11:15 A.M., the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War met again to consider the military option. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels.

At 11:30 A.M., the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War met again to consider the military option. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels.

At 11:45 A.M., the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War met again to consider the military option. The President said that he had been advised by the Secretary of State that the British Government had agreed to supply arms to the rebels.

We explained our recommendations to the President. At the beginning, the meeting seemed to proceed in an orderly and satisfactory way. However, as people talked, as the President raised probing questions, minds and opinions began to change again, and not only on small points. For some, it was from one extreme to another--supporting an air attack at the beginning of the meeting and, by the time we left the White House, supporting no action at all.

The President, not at all satisfied, sent us back to our deliberations. Because any other step would arouse suspicion, he returned to his regular schedule and his campaign speaking engagements.

The next morning, at our meeting at the State Department, there were sharp disagreements again....

Our situation was made more difficult by the fact that there was no obvious or simple solution. A dogmatism, a certainty of viewpoint, was simply not possible. For every position there were inherent weaknesses; and those opposed would point them out, often with devastating effects.

Finally, we agreed on a procedure by which we felt we could give some intelligent recommendations to the President. We knew that time was running out and that delay was not possible. We split into groups to write up our respective recommendations, beginning with an outline of the President's speech to the nation and the whole course of action thereafter, trying to anticipate all possible contingencies and setting forth recommendations as to how to react to them.

In the early afternoon, we exchanged papers, each group dissected and criticized the other, and then the papers were returned to the original group to develop further answers. Gradually from all this came the outline of definitive plans....

We met all day Friday and Friday night. Then again early Saturday morning we were back at the State Department....I called the President at the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago and told him we were ready to meet with him. It was now up to one single man. No committee was going to make this decision. He canceled his trip and returned to Washington....

The President arrived back at the White House at 1:40 p.m. and went for a swim. I sat on the side of the pool, and we talked. At 2:30 we walked up to the Oval Room.

The meeting went on until ten minutes after five. Convened as a formal meeting of the National Security Council, it was a larger group of people who met, some of whom had not participated in the deliberations up to that time. Bob McNamara presented the arguments for the blockade; others presented the arguments for the military attack.

The discussion, for the most part, was able and organized, although, like all meetings of this kind, certain statements were made as accepted truisms, which I, at least, thought were of questionable validity....

The President made his decision that afternoon in favor of the blockade....

...I think it should be emphasized that he [Stevenson] was presenting a point of view from a different perspective than the others, one which was therefore important for the President to consider. Although I disagreed strongly with his recommendations, I thought he was courageous to make them, and I might add they made as much sense as some others considered during that period of time.

The President's speech was now scheduled for Monday evening. Under the direction of George Ball, Alex Johnson, and Ed Martin, a detailed hour-to-hour program was arranged, to inform our allies, prepare for the meeting of the OAS, inform the ambassadors stationed in Washington, and prepare for them and others, in written form, the legal justification on which our action was predicated. More and more government officials were brought into the discussions, and finally word began to seep through to the press that a serious crisis was imminent. Through the personal intervention of the President with several newspapers, the only stories written Monday morning were reports that a major speech was to be given by the President and that the country faced a serious crisis.

[Members of the OAS countries, Britain, France, Germany and Candad were told of the President's decision. The Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was called in an hour before the President's speech and told of the decision.]

Shortly thereafter, the President met with the members of the Cabinet and informed them for the first time of the crisis. Then, not long before the broadcast, he met with the leaders of Congress. This was the most difficult meeting. I did not attend, but I know from seeing him afterward that it was a tremendous strain.

Many Congressional leaders were sharp in their criticism....

At 7:00 o'clock, he went on television to the nation to explain the situation in Cuba and the reasons for the quarantine. He was calm and confident that he had selected the right course....

During the Cuban missile crisis, the President not only received information from all the significant departments, but went to considerable lengths to ensure that he was not insulated from individuals or points of

view because of rank or position. He wanted the advice of his Cabinet officers, but he also wanted the opinion of those who were connected with the situation itself. He wanted to hear from Secretary Rusk, but he also wished to hear from Tommy Thompson, former (and now again) Ambassador to the Soviet Union, whose advice on the Russians and predictions as to what they would do were uncannily accurate and whose advice and recommendations were surpassed by none; from Ed Martin, Assistant Secretary for Latin America who organized our effort to secure the backing of the Latin American countries; also from George Ball, the Under Secretary of State, whose advice and judgment were invaluable. He wanted to hear from Secretary McNamara, but he wanted to hear also from Under Secretary Gilpatric, whose ability, knowledge, and judgment he sought in every serious crisis.

On other occasions, I had frequently observed efforts being made to exclude certain individuals from participating in a meeting with the President because they held a different point of view. Often, the President would become aware of this fact and enlarge the meetings to include other opinions. At the missile-crisis conferences he made certain there were experts and representatives of different points of view. President Kennedy wanted people who raised questions, who criticized, on whose judgment he could rely, who presented an intelligent point of view, regardless of their rank or viewpoint.

He wanted to hear presented and challenged all the possible consequences of a particular course of action. The first step might appear sensible, but what would be the reaction of our adversaries and would we actually stand to gain?...

It was to obtain an unfettered and objective analysis that he frequently, and in critical times, invited [various people]. They asked the difficult questions; they made others defend their position; they presented a different point of view; and they were skeptical.

I think this was more necessary in the military field than any other....

But he was distressed that the representatives with whom he met, with the notable exception of General Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of steps they suggested. They seemed always to assume that if the Russians and the Cubans would not respond or, if they did, that a war was in our national interest. One of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once said to me he believed in a preventive attack against the Soviet Union. On that fateful Sunday morning when the Russians answered they were withdrawing their missiles, it was suggested by one high military adviser that we attack Monday in any case. Another felt that we had in some way been betrayed.

President Kennedy was disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field. When we talked about this later, he said we had to remember that they were trained to fight and to wage war--that was their life. Perhaps we would feel even more concerned if they were always opposed to using arms or military means--for if they would not be willing, who would be? But this experience pointed out for us all the importance of civilian direction and control and the importance of raising probing questions to military recommendations.

It was for these reasons, and many more, that President Kennedy regarded Secretary McNamara as the most valuable public servant in his Administration and in the government.

From all this probing and examination--of the military, State Department, and their recommendations--President Kennedy hoped that he would at least be prepared for the foreseeable contingencies and know that--although no course of action is ever completely satisfactory--he had made his decision based on the best possible information. His conduct of the missile crisis showed how important this kind of skeptical probing and questioning could be.

Excerpts from an article by Richard Strout Christian Science Monitor May 1970

On the CBS "Face the Nation" April 26, GOP Senate whip Robert P. Griffin of Michigan said there was no possibility that the United states would send troops into Cambodia. He had reportedly been briefed in advance at the White House. Since then he has kept his feelings under control with difficulty.

The credibility of Secretary of State William P. Rogers is seriously challenged by what he told two congressional committees. The partial text of his testimony before a closed session of the House Appropriations Committee April 23 shows him saying, "We have no incentive to escalate" and that "our whole (Vietnamization) program is defeated."

On April 27 he came to a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and appeared to agree with warnings against sending arms into Cambodia.

Three days later Mr. Nixon made his electrifying announcement.

Another incident involved Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, who publicly warned the North Vietnamese that if they invaded South Vietnam during the Cambodian operation he would recommend bombing. Sen. Hugh Scott (R) of Pennsylvania, the minority leader, issued a statement saying that Secretary Laird was speaking in a personal sense and not expressing a new policy.

But at approximately the same time news came from Hanoi Radio that 100 U.S. planes had bombed North Vietnam.

On Monday, May 4, Mr. Laird told the House defense appropriations sub-committee, where he formerly served, that there had been "three" raids.

He learned that there had been a fourth raid in time for the White House congressional briefing on the morning of May 5

1) How closely does this article suggest that President Nixon worked with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in making his decision to send troops into Cambodia?

2) How can you explain the discrepancies between what Secretaries Laird and Rogers were saying and what President Nixon was doing?

a. Would President Nixon deliberately ignore his Secretaries of Defense and State in making foreign policy decisions?

b. Would President Nixon misinform Secretaries Laird and Rogers for some reason? Why?

c. Would Secretaries Laird and Rogers lie to members of Congress for some reason? Why?

Excerpts from the New York Times, May 10, 1970

How Nixon Made the Fateful Cambodia Decision

During his campaign for the Presidency, Richard Nixon stopped in Dallas one October night, and, in a local television interview, offered a preview summary of how foreign policy was to be run under his dispensation.

"When it comes to foreign policy," he told his interviewer, "I have strong convictions about the necessity for strengthening the United States, and dealing... from a position of strength." Then he added, as if to warn those whom he would eventually choose for Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, "I am going to call the turn, my competence is in the foreign field."

Mr. Nixon's comments that evening still provide what is probably the best explanation for his momentous decision to send American ground troops into Cambodia. Sensing a challenge to American credibility and possibly his own, he responded. And he responded alone.

Who Advised What

Much has been written in the past week about that decision and about the men who advised him on it. But nobody has been able fully to determine who advised what.

Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Secretary of State Rogers are all believed to have registered objections. But whether their objections were fundamental or merely tactical is not entirely clear. The most anyone can agree on is that it was very largely the President's own calculations that drove him to make the move.

"I made this decision," the President said at his news conference Friday. "I take the responsibility for it. I believe it was the right decision. I believe it will work out. If it doesn't, I am to blame."

Yet the decision and the way in which it was conceived still puzzle observers here. Apart from Mr. Nixon's decisive role, only two other points can be made with certainty. If the President, as he claimed at his news conference, correctly calculated the domestic impact of his decision ("I knew the division that would be caused in this country"), then he dismissed it as less important than the tactical objectives of the invasion itself. The second point is that there is no evidence whatever that others in the White House who might not have shared his estimate of the domestic impact were ever consulted.

Even the official scenario of the events leading up to the decision omits the names of John Ehrlichman, Mr. Nixon's domestic affairs adviser; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, his counsellor; Leonard Garment, his special consultant on civil rights; Donald Rumsfeld, his antipoverty director; Robert Finch, the Secretary of Health Education, and Welfare -- and of course, Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel, who made his dismay transparently clear on Wednesday. They were not asked for their opinions.

Occasional Talk

As best as anyone can make it out -- and this is not an "official scenario" -- there was occasional talk in the White House about the
 (continued)

Excerpts from the New York Times, May 10, 1970 (continued)

possibility of moving into Cambodia not long after the fall of neutralist Prince Norodom Sihanouk on March 18 and his replacement by the rightist regime of Gen. Lon Nol. These events, Secretary Laird mentioned candidly last week, gave the Administration a "political opportunity" -- a high White House source called it a "diplomatic opening" -- for a military assault on the sanctuaries, which the Joint Chiefs had been urging for years.

Systematic consideration of such a venture did not begin, however, until the President's April 20 announcement that another 150,000 American troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam by June of 1971. At that juncture, several attacks by the Communists on Cambodian towns reinforced fears that the Communists would try to turn a series of isolated supply points into one contiguous base operation along the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border.

The President met with his National Security Council twice -- in an announced session April 22, and in a secret session April 26 -- but the real task of devising alternative means of approaching the Cambodian problem was entrusted to the Washington Special Action Group, headed by Dr. Kissinger and including Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of Defense David Packard, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle G. Wheeler and C.I.A. director Richard Helms. The careful decision-making process of the N.S.C. on which the President has normally relied was largely bypassed, as were lower-echelon experts in the Cabinet departments.

The Special Action Group met three times -- twice on April 23, once the next day -- but it did not make the final decision. Its assignment was merely to prepare various contingency plans and assess possible reaction to them from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Hanoi. These plans were presented to the President by Dr. Kissinger at Camp David on April 25; and on Monday night, April 27, in the solitude of his hideaway in the Executive Office Building, next to the White House, Mr. Nixon made his decision. He called several aides, and the next morning told Mr. Rogers and Mr. Laird, both of whom had had a rough idea of what was coming. On April 30 the President announced his plans to a stunned nation.

The reasons offered by the President that night did not fully satisfy anyone. He said the sanctuaries threatened his Vietnamization; he said he was frustrated by repeated diplomatic rebuffs. Since then, the maneuver has been interpreted psychologically as a personal response by a man who did not wish to appear weak -- and in diplomatic terms, as a deliberate show of force designed to shore up American credibility in other parts of the world and jar Hanoi into serious negotiations.

But the fact remains that many people in the Administration who accept all or part of these explanations as valid still worry about the way in which Mr. Nixon went about making up his mind. It gave them further evidence that this President, who is easily preoccupied by a single subject anyway, tends to regard the pursuit of foreign affairs -- "my strong suit," he once said -- and the pursuit of domestic affairs as only casually related enterprises. And even if he did make the connection, the ensuing furor suggests that he badly miscalculated the ability of the public at large -- not just radical students -- to sustain one more military venture advertised as "necessary to shorten the war."

Excerpts from The Old Mole
May 8, 1970

As the unexpectedly early monsoon rains fell on War Zone "C" by the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border, a U.S. divisional planning office said, "The people who advised President Nixon to start something like this at this time of year must be the same ones who advised him on candidates for the Supreme Court."

The rain-soaked army officer was right. Attorney General Mitchell's counsel had drawn Nixon into the muck of the Carswell and Haynesworth affairs and it was Mitchell who was the most enthusiastic civilian proponent of the thrust into a Cambodian quagmire.

Perhaps Nixon suspected that the invasion of Cambodia might be no more popular than the Carswell nomination as he labored through eight drafts of his April 30 television speech announcing the move. He described the war in Cambodia as a way to end the war in Vietnam: "We take this action not for the purpose of extending the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam."

Only an "extension" into Cambodia, Nixon claimed, would permit him to bring the boys home from Vietnam: "A majority of the American people, a majority of you listening to me, are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program."

One of the reasons the U.S. cannot inflict substantial harm on the NLF in this move can be found in this anomaly: although Nixon kept the Cambodian invasion a secret from the Saigon regime, the Cambodian administration, Congress, and most of his own Cabinet, including the Secretary of State, the National Liberation front knew of the attack three days before it occurred, and dispersed from its bases in the area.

The National Liberation Front is highly mobile: when necessary, they can march 25 miles in one night, carrying their equipment.

One objective of the mission, Nixon said, was to locate and destroy "major base camps." Major base camps, however, are merely a collection of thatch and bamboo huts and some tents.

But the prize target was to be the NLF headquarters, labelled "COSVN" by the US military. Nixon proclaimed in his speech, "Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam." Quite aside from the fact that the US has yet to locate this "key control center" which Nixon claimed would be attacked on Thursday night, "COSVN" is an irrelevant target, and if located will be nothing more than some abandoned huts. COSVN is not a Vietnamese Pentagon, with tons of vital carbon copies in its files; the NLF commanders move every few days, and all essential communications are very mobile.

COSVN was also an announced objective in 1967's "Operation Junction City," in many ways a model of the military strategies used in the invasion of Cambodia.

The clearest result of Operation Junction City and Operation Cedar Falls was to develop loyalty among the people for the NLF. The American atrocities were so awful, as they must be in a "search and destroy" mission, involving the destruction of the village of Ben Suc in Operation Cedar Falls, for example, and the expulsion of its inhabitants into concentration camps, that hatred of the US invasion intensified, and adherence to the NLF increased.

The invasion of Cambodia, like the earlier search and destroy missions, is perpetuating the outrages that turn victims into insurgents. Already, for instance, the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has burned five villages in the Fish-hook, each with thirty to forty homes.

"I had orders to burn everything," a tank commander whose force had just razed two villages told AP correspondent Peter Arnett.

The invading forces have been told to burn homes and shoot livestock belonging to Cambodian peasants because the property might be of use to the NLF.

US air strikes have blown up the town of Mimot - until the invasion, the Mimot Plantation was the largest functioning rubber plantation in Indochina. As the rubber workers' homes are demolished and their relatives killed, they can be expected to flock to insurgent forces.

The Lon Nol coup which ousted the neutralist Sihanouk in March has supplemented the US invasion of Cambodia in pressing the country's peasants into rebellion. Repression of pro-Sihanouk demonstrations among the peasants towards the end of March in which hundreds of Cambodians were shot, swelled the bands of insurgents.

Many peasants, fearful of arrest after the demonstrations, took to the jungle rather than return to their homes. As early as April 22, Le Monde reported that "peasants in Viet Cong areas are now armed and trained. The nucleus of a liberation army is probably being constituted."

1. Do you think the interests of American troops, South Vietnamese, Cambodian peasants and other directly affected people were taken into account when Nixon made his Cambodia decision?
 - a. Whose interests do you think were weighed most heavily?
 - b. Whose interests do you think should have been considered?
2. How do you think the Cambodians will react to our "invasion"?
3. What facts about the geography of Indo-China and the nature of the war do you think Nixon should have considered before starting to "clean out" the Cambodian sanctuaries?
4. Do you think Nixon's plan to clean out the sanctuaries in Cambodia will work?

Excerpts from the Wall Street Journal
May 8, 1970

AN INACCESSIBLE NIXON STIRS ANGER AND DESPAIR WITHIN ADMINISTRATION

A deep⁸ning malaise grips the highest levels of the Nixon Administration, as many of the men the President picked to help him run the government find themselves increasingly cut off from access to the Chief Executive himself.

Cabinet members and sub-Cabinet officials complain that Mr. Nixon is insulated from them by a screen of elite aides; information and compet opinions fail to filter through to the lonely Oval Office. Issues pile up awaiting decision. When a decision does finally emerge, the Cabinet men and their top lieutenants may find it unrecognizable; their counsel has been overruled by men in the tiny innermost circle.

Morale sags. Men who planned to stay the course now talk of leaving; and men who planned to leave at the end of the year talk of leaving now.

The troubling situation can hardly be overstated. The unhappiness and disillusionment is deep and wide, predating Cambodia and Kent State and encompassing a range of domestic and foreign issues. Interior Sec. Walter Hickel's plaintive bid for the Presidential ear--a Cabinet member forced to write a letter and leak it to the press in order to obtain the President's attention--is merely the most dramatic and public evidence.

Consider these other examples:

Secretary of State William Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird have been caught off guard by some of the most momentous Nixon decisions regarding the Southeast Asian war, in part because of the White House fear that their departments can't keep secrets.

Housing Secretary George Romney, reading the papers while on vacation in Hawaii, learned for the first time that the White House was contemplating deep cuts in his Model Cities budget. He is now back here (in Washington) "hopping mad", according to a top aide--demanding a face-to-face confrontation with the President before a final decision is made.

A high Commerce Department official with a pressing question about a vital foreign trade policy problem strove in vain for one whole year to obtain an audience with the appropriate White House staffers.

A Transportation Department chieftain needing a Presidential yes or no on a plan for preserving rail passenger service was side-tracked for so long that he toyed with the idea of stomping into the Whit House and setting up an electric train to dramatize his frustration.

Disappointment over lack of access to a President is nothing new in Washington; a common capital cliche has it that the scarcest commodity in the world is the time of the President of the United States. But Nixon appointees can recite that cliche with unusual feeling--and now that Cambodia and the campus are such overriding concerns, officials handling less dramatic matters can expect to find the President even less accessible than before.

AN INACCESSIBLE NIXON (cont.)

In December 1968, introducing his 12 Cabinet members to the American people on television, President-elect Nixon promised that "ever man in this Cabinet will be urged to speak out in the Cabinet and within the Administration on all the great issues so that the decisions we make will be the best decision we can possibly reach." Yet today only four of those men--Attorney General John Mitchell, Secretaries Laird and Rogers and Labor Secretary George Shultz--are said to have ready access to the boss.

Mr. Mitchell, the bond-market lawyer who managed the Nixon election campaign, wields paramount influence; even the other three sometimes find themselves in the dark about what's on the Nixon mind. Only four days before the President announced the commitment of troops to Cambodia, Mr. Rogers was telling Congressmen such a course would mean "our whole program of Vietnamization is defeated." Earlier, Mr. Laird didn't know up to the last minute that the President would announce a decision to pull 150,000 troops out of Vietnam within 12 months; the Defense Secretary kept right on talking almost to the very end about 40,000 to 50,000 troops within four months.

In general frustrated would-be policy makers concede high regard for the intelligence of the key men around the President. But there's deep resentment and growing concern about what is felt to be his overreliance on them. Besides Mr. Mitchell, the names most mentioned as part of the inner circle are John Ehrlichman, majordomo for domestic affairs; Henry Kissinger, the foreign-affairs counterpart; H.R. Haldeman who decides which persons and papers get through to the President, and Peter Flannigan, general troubleshooter.

Frequently, however, a Cabinet member can't even penetrate to anybody in this inner circle, let alone to the President himself. White House men confirm that it's quite common for the head of a Cabinet department to be denied an audience with Mr. Ehrlichman and instead be shunted to one of his half-dozen deputies--even though the deputy may be half as old as the Cabinet member and far less experienced.

The official current defense of this procedure seems far removed from Mr. Nixon's December 1968 promise of easy access. "We can't have a lot of Cabinet guys running in to the President," a White House insider asserts, "or He'd never have a question refined to where it's worth his making a decision."

Another Nixon intimate rejects the suggestion that this emphasis on orderly processes denies the President any real feeling for what's going around him, and in the nation at large. Through memos and talks with the top staff aides, he insists, the President gets a very full understanding of what the Cabinet departments are urging. Even more important, this man argues, the present system somehow tends to keep the President from becoming overly preoccupied and immersed in any one problem--"He's not going down to the war room in his slippers like LBJ."

Views may legitimately differ, of course, on what subjects are vital enough to warrant speedy Presidential attention and decision. But many Government men complain that the current White House team often fails to recognize how important some matters are.

Questions for AN INACCESSIBLE NIXON STIRS ANGER AND DESPAIR...

This article suggests that the morale of high officials in Washington is sagging because they cannot get access to the President.

1. How do you think the President's isolation from certain high officials in the government affected his decision about Cambodia?
2. What benefits does Nixon gain from not informing or conferring with most of the members of his Cabinet about decisions until the last minute?
3. What risks does the President run by not informing or conferring with members of his Cabinet about decisions until the last minute?

Exerrpts from the Christian Science Monitor
 April 27, 1970

Richard M. Nixon is learning what it was like in the early days of Lyndon B. Johnson.

He is hearing exactly the same arguments about Cambodia that his predecessor heard about Vietnam, back in the days before the commitment of half a million men there was made.

Literally, the President is being told that:

1. Recent events in Cambodia have provided a "golden opportunity."
2. If he will only move into Cambodia swiftly with American weapons and advisers he will be able to strangle enemy forces in South Vietnam and win a military victory there.
3. It will take relatively little in the way of Americans because Communist forces in the area are stretched thin at the end of a long supply line and are weary from years of war.
4. But if he fails to act all of Cambodia will be taken over by the Communists with four to six weeks and lost forever to the West...
5. Chinese Communists will begin supplying enemy forces in South Vietnam through the southern ports of Cambodia....
6. Probably the Russians will join the Chinese....
7. Communism in Cambodia will infect Laos, and Thailand, and the infection might then spread farther to the south.

This, literally, is what the President is being told from the military side of the table of his advisers. The men are not the same ones who advised Mr. Johnson, but advice and its source are.

It was on the basis of precisely such reasoning that Mr. Johnson began the commitments which led him ever deeper into the longest and least conclusive war in American history.

There are two reasons why President Nixon is likely to react more cautiously to today's military advice than did his predecessor.

The first is that he was a witness of what happened to his predecessor.

The second is that Mr. Nixon is operating under a doctrine quite different than the one still in conventional force at the time of the Johnson decisions.

Back in 1964 and 1965 when President Johnson was getting ready to go for a military victory in Vietnam, the official doctrine governing American foreign policy was still the Truman Doctrine of 1946. This called for meeting communism wherever it appeared to be expanding and aggressive with military force.

Christian Science Monitor article cont.

But in 1970 the official guiding theory is provided by President Nixon's own "Guam doctrine" which teaches that Asiatics should take care of their own problems.

Under the Guam Doctrine the United States stands offshore. It can give aid to those who request it if they show the ability to do their own fighting. But essentially the Guam doctrine follows the teaching of Walter Lippmann that in Asia the United States should be an offshore presence, never an on-shore belligerent.

Ever since enunciating the Guam doctrine President Nixon has been gradually pulling American troops back from the deeper jungles of Asia toward the coastline, and from the coastline back home. American troops in Vietnam are increasingly occupying "coastal enclaves," as once recommended by Gen. James M. Gavin.

Perhaps one should add a third reason to the list of those which act on President Nixon against the advice he is getting from the Pentagon. It is a fact frequently ignored in public discussions of the Vietnam war, the fact that the North Vietnam Regular Army has never yet been heavily committed to the fighting in South Vietnam.

That the North Vietnam Army is regarded by American and other Western experts as probably the most efficient and most highly motivated army in all of Asia, better even than the Chinese. Many of its officers and noncoms have done tours of duty in South Vietnam. But, largely, that army has been held in reserve in the north probably mostly to guard against the possibility, often discussed, of an American invasion of North Vietnam. Perhaps also its secondary mission is to keep the Chinese out of Vietnam.

But whatever the reason, there is an experienced and highly respected army in North Vietnam, which has never yet been committed to battle, but could be committed if at any time Washington decided to attempt to win a decisive military victory in Southeast Asia.

That North Vietnam "army-in-being" is a major reason why to this day the United States has never opened a "second front" in Laos or Cambodia; or made attempts to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Hanoi always had in hand, unused, fresh and ready, the answer of the regular army of North Vietnam.

A corollary to the above is that American troops in Southeast Asia tend to act as a magnet. Wherever they go, so too do Communist forces. The net of it all is that although Mr. Nixon is being urged from the Pentagon to act while there is still time, in theory, to save the imperiled regime of Gen. Lon Nol in Phnom Penh, he probably will be guided by his own Guam Doctrine.

Christian Science Monitor article cont.

Which seems to mean that Gen. Long Nol will get what aid he does mostly from South Vietnam and such other Asian countries as choose to come to his help.

The diplomatic world would then have an opportunity to find out what really does happen when the United States meets a situation in Asia by means other than its own weapons.

One theory here among diplomats is that the best way to keep the Communists from taking over the whole of Cambodia is to have Washington keep hands off and its troops out.

This theory has never before been willingly tried out by Washington. It has merely been tried, unwillingly, in Burma. It is merely an observable fact that the Burmese are still running their own affairs.

There are more Communists behaving more aggressively in Thailand, which does have American troops.

What might be tested here is the possible demilitarization of American foreign policy. From 1949 the prime and often only weapon of American foreign policy has been its armed forces. A new doctrine, as yet not proved conclusively, is that under present circumstances this weapon can be counterproductive. A corollary is that there are other tools at hand worth trying.

Mr. Nixon is being urged from the State Department to put aside the military weapon for Cambodia and use others.

The above article was written 3 days before Nixon announced his decision to go into Cambodia.

1. What advice was Nixon receiving from the Pentagon about Cambodia?
2. According to this article what advice and information that was contrary to the military's was available to Nixon when he made his Cambodia decision?
3. Why do you think Nixon ended up following basically what the military was suggesting, despite the advice and information available to him which suggested that this kind of move was a mistake?
4. What does the author of this article mean when he says that "under present circumstances this weapon (the armed forces) can be counterproductive?"

Excerpts from the Boston Globe, May 6, 1970

WORLD UNREST FOLLOWS U.S. CAMBODIA ACTION

Unrest and demonstrations continued today throughout the world in protest against the presence of United States ground troops in Cambodia and the shooting deaths of four students at Kent State University in Ohio.

In SAIGON, the South Vietnamese government moved four battalions of troops into the city today as a precaution against growing civil unrest in the capital.

American servicemen were ordered to stay out of Saigon except on official business, and the USO Club here--a favorite gathering place for G.I.'s--was closed indefinitely.

The government ordered all schools in Saigon closed until further notice and put stricter curfew regulations into effect. The new curfew for civilians starts at 11 p.m. rather than 1 a.m. and ends at 5:30 a.m. The school closing order shut down all grade schools, high schools and universities.

In NEW ZEALAND 300 demonstrators staged a sitdown outside the U.S. consulate at Auckland today to protest the killing of the four students at Kent State and the advance of U.S. troops into Cambodia. The demonstration was peaceful, but eight persons were arrested.

In SWEDEN a scheduled visit to the university town of Lund by the new U. S. ambassador to Stockholm, Jerome Holland, was cancelled at the last moment today because of the fears of large-scale demonstrations against the U.S. intervention in Cambodia.

In TEL AVIV the U.S. embassy lowered the American flag to half staff at the request of 30 American Jewish students who recited prayers of mourning for four students shot to death by National Guardsmen at Kent State University.

In LONDON Molotov cocktails crashed through windows of the U.S. embassy setting a fire, and vandals painted a swastika and dollar signs on nearby American-owned businesses.

In INDIA people shouting slogans against U.S. action in Cambodia ransacked the library of the American University center at Calcutta damaging a statue of Abraham Lincoln and smashing a portrait of Pres. Nixon. One person arrested.

In VATICAN CITY Pope Paul VI said today the extension of the war in Southeast Asia in the last few days threatened to multiply the suffering and the number of victims in the area.

Excerpted from the Christian Science Monitor ("")

WHAT WILL MOSCOW AND PEKING DO?

Soviet Premier Kosygin has had his Kremlin news conference to condemn United States military moves inside Cambodia. And simultaneously, Peking has followed up its denunciation of American policy toward Cambodia on the eve of President's Nixon's decision last week with a further blast against "U.S. imperialism's aggression against Cambodia." But the leaders in Moscow and Peking have both left the outside world in suspense about any action they might be contemplating to follow up their exercise in verbal excoriation.

There is no doubt but that the events of recent weeks have seen China win more points than Russia in the continuing struggle between the two--in the contest to show who is the more effective and genuine of them in the struggle against "U.S. imperialism." To begin with, Chairman Mao's Sputnik is circling the earth every 114 minutes with its reminder that "The East is Red." Then there is Premier Chou En-lai's quiet coup in establishing his patronage of, and securing Russian exclusion from last week's summit conference of the Communist and "progressive" forces of the three countries of former Indo-China.

Mr. Kosygin, in the Kremlin, went no further than saying: "The Soviet Government will naturally draw the proper conclusions for its policy from the course of action of the United States in Southeast Asia." What does this mean? Perhaps making difficulties over continuing the SALT talks in Vienna. (The United States made difficulties about starting them after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.) Perhaps doing even less than in the past in the direction of a negotiated Indo-Chinese settlement. Perhaps being even less conciliatory in the Middle East. Certainly plenty of verbal support for the "progressive" cause in Indo-China--and probably more weapons and materiel, too.

The latest Chinese statement promises "powerful backing" and "all-out support and assistance." Does this mean "volunteers"? Our guess would be that it does not--unless widening operations brought ground forces from the United States into Laos and North Vietnam (with their frontiers with China). But it could mean more material aid, including Chinese engineering and construction teams, greater Chinese participation overall planning--and even sanctuary or rear-command posts on Chinese territory. In other words, the Chinese are probably still waiting to see how far the Americans will go.

1. From what you have read of the factors which were considered in the Cambodian decision, how much attention was given to possible reactions of other world powers?
2. Do you think some countries' reactions to the Cambodia decision were considered to be more important than others when Nixon made his decision?
3. Should the reactions of other countries be a major consideration in a U.S. foreign policy decision?

Excerpts from the New York Times, May, 1970

Moves in Congress to Curb Power of President, by John W. Finney, May 10

WASHINGTON--For all the talk in recent years about restoring the war-making powers of Congress, nobody, not even the ardent champions of Congressional authority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ever really expected that Congress would take any specific steps to curb the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief.

Now abruptly, the outlook has changed because President Nixon chose to send American troops into Cambodia without the knowledge or consent of Congress and not too incidentally because thousands of college students have chosen to descend upon the capital to protest the intervention. It may turn out to be one of Mr. Nixon's more serious political miscalculations in his Cambodian decision, for he is now faced with a constitutional challenge from Congress that could amount to a vote of no confidence in the way he has exercised his powers as Commander-in-Chief.

Just as importantly, the challenge could lead to a reversal by Congress of a foreign policy of the White House, for what the Administration critics are trying to do is to use Congress's power over the purse-strings to circumscribe the war-making powers of the Chief Executive in Southeast Asia and if possible to force an end to the Vietnam war.

There is nothing that Congress can or is trying to do to stop the present Cambodian operation. That operation was undertaken by the President on the basis of his authority as Commander-in-Chief, with the inherent powers to take steps to protect the safety of American troops. Particularly so long as American boys are under fire, nobody in Congress is ready to challenge that decision of the Commander-in-Chief. But in a prospective sense, Congress can prohibit future military involvements in Cambodia or Laos or Thailand, and that is precisely what the Administration critics, including some prominent Republicans, are trying to do through various legislative amendments that were piling on top of each other on Capitol Hill last week.

Into this long simmering Senate cauldron has been injected a new political ingredient--the outpouring of protest from thousands of college students who descended on the Capitol with demands that Congress, through legislative action, bring an end not only to the Cambodian operation but also to the Vietnam war.

Presidential Desire

Belatedly and with a lack of sensitivity for the institutional pride of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the President sought to avoid the impending confrontation with the Senate last week by making some concessions on the Cambodian operation. At a joint meeting with the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday evening, he pledged that American troops would penetrate no further than 35 kilometers into Cambodia without the consent of Congress and that the forces would be withdrawn before July 1.

That President Nixon had failed to disarm the Senate opposition, even in his own Republican ranks, became apparent on Friday when Senator Cooper, along with Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, unveiled an amendment that would preclude the Executive branch from using any appropriations for "retaining" ground forces in Cambodia or for providing air combat support, military advisers or mercenaries to the Cambodian Government. The Cooper-Church amendment will be considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with a foreign military sales bill that is scheduled to reach the Senate floor this week.

An even more restrictive amendment is being advanced by Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, and Senator Mark Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, with the support thus far of 15 other Senators. Labelled "The Amendment to End the War," it would cut off funds for any military operations in Cambodia in 30 days and in Laos by the end of the year and require the withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam by June 30, 1971, unless there is a declaration of war by Congress.

The tough McGovern-Hatfield amendment probably goes too far for the majority of the Senate, and the Cooper-Church amendment is more likely to be adopted.

Perhaps that would only be a symbolic step by the Senate since the President, particularly after the political uproar, undoubtedly has no desire to become involved again in Cambodia. But in a historical sense, the Senate would have taken an important step in redressing the war-making powers by making clear it was opposed to a wider war in Indochina and laying down legislative injunctions to prevent it.

From New York Times, May 3

... By broadening the war, Mr. Nixon may have provoked a constitutional confrontation with a Congress already worried that its war-making power is being usurped by the President.

The public Congressional reaction to the Presidential decision was mixed, as might be expected in a Congress deeply divided over the Vietnam war. In fact, the reaction was generally favorable among the Congressional leaders who had been called to the White House to listen to the President deliver his speech announcing the intervention in Cambodia.

Deep Skepticism

Many in Congress were prepared to accept the President's logic that destruction of the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia could have the effect of saving American lives in Vietnam and hastening the withdrawal of American forces. But there were others who were deeply skeptical that this military logic would work in the jungles of Cambodia any more than it did with each escalatory step in Vietnam. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who significantly broke with the Administration on its Cambodian decision, summed up this skepticism when he told the Senate in a voice shrill with anger:

'There is nothing in past experiences in Indochina to suggest that casualties can be reduced by enlarging the area of military operations. There is nothing in past experience to suggest that the way out of the Vietnamese conflict follows the road of a second Indochina war. Indeed, the road may well meander throughout all of Southeast Asia and end nobody knows where.'

Perhaps more important than this widespread skepticism was a disquiet in Congress over the manner in which the President chose to commit American troops to combat in Cambodia without advising or consulting with Congress, much less obtaining its approval.

It seemed like an impolitic way to handle a Congress that after the Vietnam experience is generally opposed to a continuing involvement in Southeast Asia and that is increasingly intent on reasserting what it regards as its constitutional prerogative to commit American troops to foreign hostilities.

1. Do you think Nixon deliberately avoided Congressional advice in making his decision?
2. Do you think the Cambodian situation is serious enough for Nixon to assume his special powers as Commander in Chief of the U. S. military to send troops to Cambodia?
3. Should Congress prevent the President from acting without consulting Congress or does the President have a right to make a decision by himself?
4. How could Congress act to prevent a repetition of this kind of Presidential action in the future?

New York Times - July 26, 1969

Excerpts from Unofficial Account of President Nixon's Meeting with Reporters

MANILA, July 25--Following are excerpts from an unofficial account of President Nixon's informal news conference today during his stopover on Guam. (Mr. Nixon spoke for publication but stipulated that he not be quoted directly.)

So, what he is trying to suggest is this, the President said: Look at Asia. It poses, in his view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to peace of the world, and, for that reason the United States should continue to play a significant role.

It also poses, he said, the greatest hope for progress in the world because of the ability, the resources, the ability of the people, the resources physically that are available in this part of the world, and for these reasons, we need policies that will see that we play a part and a part that is appropriate to the condition that we will find.

One other point he made very briefly was that in terms of this situation we must recognize that there are two great new factors which you will see, incidentally, particularly, when you arrive on the fourteenth--something you will see there that we didn't see in 1953, to show you how quickly things change--a very great growth of nationalism, nationalism even in the Philippines, vis-a-vis the United States, as well as other countries in the world. And, also, at the same time that national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.

The second factor, he went on, is one that is going to have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account. Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from the outside. Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want and that is the role we should play. We should assist it, but we should not dictate.

At this time, he said, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful. We will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty, commitments, we have.

But as far as our role is concerned, he said we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.

This is going to be a difficult line to follow. It is one, however, that he thinks, with proper planning, we can develop, he went on.

The President was asked, on the question of the United States military relationships in Asia, a hypothetical question: If a leader of one of the countries with which we have had close military relationships, either through SEATO or in Vietnam, should say, "Well, you are pulling out of Vietnam with your troops. We can read the newspapers. How can we know you will remain to play a significant role as you say you wish to do in the security arrangements in Europe?" What kind of approach would he take to that question?

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New York Times - July 26, 1969

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The President replied that he had indicated that the answer to that question was not an easy one--not easy because we would be greatly tempted when that question is put to us to indicate that if any nation desires the assistance of the United States militarily in order to meet an internal or external threat we will provide it.

On Commitment, 2 Points

However, he said he believed that the time had come when the United States, in its relations with all of its Asian friends, should be quite emphatic on two points: one, that we would keep our treaty commitments; our treaty commitments, for example, in Thailand under SEATO. And, two, that as far as the problems of international security are concerned, as far as the problem of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States was going to encourage and had a right to expect that this problem would be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.

He said he believed, from his preliminary conversations with several Asian leaders over the last few months, that they were going to be willing to undertake this responsibility. He said it would not be easy. But if the United States just continued down the road of responding to requests for assistance, of assuming the primary responsibility for defending those countries when they have international problems or external problems, they are never going to take care of themselves.

He added that, when he talked about collective security for Asia, he realized that at this time it looks like a weak reed. It actually was. But looking down the road--he said he was speaking now of five years from now, ten years from now--he thought collective security, in so far as it deals with internal threats to any one of the countries, or in so far as it deals with a threat other than that posed by a nuclear power, was an objective that free Asian nations could see and which the United States should support.

The President was asked whether, when speaking of internal threats, he included threats internally assisted by a country from the outside, such as we have in Vietnam?

The President replied that, generally speaking, it was the kind of internal threat that we do have in the Asian countries. For example, in Thailand, the threat was one that was indigenous to a certain extent to the Northeast and the North, but that it would not be too serious if it were not getting the assistance that it was from the outside. The same was true in several of the other Asian countries, he said.

Then at the top of the list he placed the problem of Vietnam where, if a summit meeting would serve a useful purpose in so far as Vietnam is concerned, naturally we would welcome that opportunity. That poses, however, Mr. Nixon said, a very significant problem because whether the Soviet Union can be of assistance in Vietnam is somewhat dependent on its evaluation of whether such assistance should be so publicly provided as a summit, of course, would indicate.

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The President was asked, as a background to his thinking on Vietnam, even though it is not to be a major subject of discussion, whether he could tell what sort of reports he had received from Gen. Earle G. Wheeler about the prospects for additional replacement of American troops, and on the question of whether the fighting had eased to the point where we can make some deescalation move ourselves.

The President replied that he would rather not comment on that at this time. If, after his conversations with Ambassador Bunker and possibly with General Abrams, he feels that some comment would be appropriate, he would make it then. But he should correct one impression that he should not have left; that is that Vietnam will not be a major topic for discussion. In each of the Asian countries he is going to raise with the Asian leaders the question of the extent to which they would be willing to participate in an international supervisory bodies for elections in South Vietnam and for the policing of cease-fires, provided we are able to get any kind of acceptance on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong on his proposal of May 14th.

The President was asked whether he anticipates in that connection that during his talks with the Asian leaders he is going to have to spend a significant amount of time perhaps convincing them that his plan for withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would pose no threat to their security.

The President replied that one of the reasons for this trip is to leave no doubt in the minds of the leaders of non-Communist Asia that the United States is committed to a policy in the Pacific--a policy not of intervention but one that certainly rules out withdrawal, and regardless of what happens in Vietnam that we intend to continue to play a role in Asia to the extent that Asian nations, bilaterally and collectively, desire us to play a role.

He said he thought that some reassurance was needed because Vietnam was on the minds of all the Asian leaders. He believes, incidentally, that he will not have difficulty in providing that reassurance because, from the report that he did get from Gen. Wheeler he was told that the troop withdrawals have been accepted by the Thieu government and by the military in South Vietnam with not only very good grace but that they have responded very effectively in meeting their own requirements, and handling their own defense. He thinks that he can give some reassuring comments to those Asian leaders who might raise the question. Mr. Nixon said.

Declines to Speculate

The President was reminded that he mentioned that he felt that perhaps five years or ten years from now the Asian nations could collectively take care of their regional security problems. What is our policy to be in the meantime, he was asked, if a Vietnam-type situation does occur?

The President said he could put it this way: he recalled in 1964 some advice that he got from Mohammad Ayub Khan, who was then the President of Pakistan. This was before the United States had any significant troop commitment in Vietnam. Mr. Nixon asked him what his view was as to what our role should be. He said: "Well, the role of the United States in Vietnam or the Philippines or Thailand or any of these countries which have internal subversion is to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them." That, of course, is a good general principle, one which we would hope would be our policy generally throughout the world, the President said.

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The President was asked whether in looking at the situation in post-Vietnam and in countries other than Vietnam, it seemed to him that in terms of our military strength, the military men that we've put into these other countries to help them, or military assistance or economic assistance, that in Asia, generally, we would have more or less of this type of assistance and aid in the years down the road than we have now.

The President replied less, if he got the question correctly, would there be more or less of military type of assistance?

He was asked about both in military and non-military, since there are really two parts to this assistance problem, the economic part and the military part. Did he see us having a greater expenditure and a greater involvement in those respects or a lessened involvement as we look down the road?

The President replied that the military involvement, the military assistance, the military aid program and the rest, and particularly the commitments of military personnel, that that type of program would receive

Economic Aid Stressed

However, as far as economic programs are concerned, and particularly those of a multi-lateral character--and here he had some new ideas that he will be expanding on in the months ahead--he would say that the level of United States activity would be adequate to meet the challenge as it develops, because it is very much in our interests in terms of economic assistance, economic assistance through loans and other programs, to help build the economies of free Asia, Mr. Nixon said.

For example, the President pointed to what has happened to South Korea, what has happened to Taiwan, what has happened to Thailand, what has happened to Japan. All of them now, or virtually all, are on their own feet at least from an economic standpoint and are very good customers of ours.

Another point he would make in that respect that bears on this: how things have changed since 1953, in country after country that he visited--and he was in every one that we are visiting here and all the others as well. The ones that Secretary William P. Rogers is going to visit on his trip--among most of the intellectual leaders and among many government leaders, there was a real question as to what was the best path for progress, a question as to whether Communism, as it was developing in Red China, a Communist system was a better way to progress or whether a non-Communist system was a better way.

Now, Mr. Nixon said, one of the significant developments that has occurred over these last 16 years, with all the bad things that have occurred, including the war in Vietnam, has been that that situation has reversed itself. The appeal of the Communist philosophy, for example, in Pakistan, in India, in Indonesia, in Japan, in any one of these countries, is less today than it was 16 years ago, 10 years ago, 5 years ago.

(continued)

On the other hand, he would have to say that the effectiveness of subversive activities in any of these countries has not abated to the same extent. It can be on the upsurge. But as we look at the whole of Asia today, it is significant to note that what we have going for us more than anything else is this enormous rate of growth in non-Communist Asia as compared to Communist Asia. You compare Hong Kong with Communist China, you compare Taiwan with Communist China, you look at Japan with 100 million people, with a greater GNP than China with 700 million people. Looking clear around the perimeter, from Japan to India, we find that free Asia's record of growth is a very significant factor in affecting the thinking of those who have to make the determination as to which path they are going to take, Mr. Nixon said.

No More Vietnams? No More Vietnams?

The President was asked, when he said that the United States was going to continue to play a major role in Asia and that this is one message that he intended to take with him on this trip, whether another message was that there would be no more Vietnams.

The President replied that certainly the objective of any American administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world. He recalled he had said it and so had his opponent, Mr. Humphrey, during the campaign--that we should develop a policy that would avoid other Vietnams.

But what he said he could do was to learn from the mistakes of the past. He believed that we have, if we examine what happened in Vietnam, how we became so deeply involved--that we have a good chance of avoiding that kind of involvement in the future, he said.

Troop Withdrawals Discussed

Mr. Nixon was asked whether he intended to make it clear to the Asian leaders that if the lull in Vietnam continues, he would announce a substantial withdrawal of United States forces on August 30th.

The President replied that he would not make any announcement and no decision on troop withdrawals on the trip, and, of course, he would not make any disclosures of plans in that respect to Asian leaders prior to the time that he had discussed it with the government of South Vietnam, and then made the announcement jointly.

Tactics in Vietnam

The President was asked whether there is also a pending question as to whether his administration will change its policy of maintaining maximum military pressure on the enemy in Vietnam?

The President replied that he had been reexamining since the time that his administration came into office, our military tactics in Vietnam and one of the subjects that he has discussed at great length with Gen. Wheeler and Gen. Abrams has been the character of our commitment and the tactics that should be used. He defers, naturally, to military men, as to the conduct of a war because they are more expert than he is in this field.

However, when we are in the process of negotiations, then military tactics become part of the negotiations and, therefore, we are reevaluating our tactics in Vietnam having in mind the fact that we have a parallel action going along in the negotiating field, the President said.

~~What do you feel Nixon's speech on Asia and Southeast Asia presents?~~

Questions

Social aspects

President Nixon says that the United States must continue to play a major role in Asia because Asia poses "the greatest threat to the peace of the world" and also "the greatest hope for progress in the world". In order to keep peace and insure progress, the U.S. cannot withdraw. It is your task to evaluate his arguments in light of all the articles you have read about U.S. policy in IndoChina. Develop guidelines of your own for U.S. policy in Asia. You may take into consideration the following questions.

Is intervening in the internal politics of small Asian countries necessary to keep peace, or will it aggravate the conflict?

What means should the U.S. use if it wants to promote peace--economic aid? military aid? technical advisors? support of the United Nations? strict neutrality? Should we, or should we not interfere in internal conflicts of other countries? Are we free to intervene anywhere just because it seems to be in our interests?

Can you think of any reasons that Nixon does not mention which might explain why the U.S. wants to maintain a position of power in Asia?

Excerpt from O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, Praeger, 1968.

"In short, then, what I want the reader to realize is that a colonial situation is created, so to speak, the very instant a white man, even if he is alone, appears in the midst of a tribe, even if it is independent, so long as he is thought to be rich or powerful or merely immune to the local forces of magic, and so long as he derives from his position, even though only in his most secret self, a feeling of his own superiority. The man-in-the-street will say instinctively and without experience that if a white man who goes among the negroes avoids being eaten he will become King. However consciously watchful we are, we can never entirely eradicate this assumption of superiority from our unconscious, and it must be included among the data of the problem if we are thus to avoid all risk of error."

Questions

This is a common perception among colonized peoples and minority groups. Discuss Mannoni's comment and relate it to Mr. Nixon's Guam speech. Given this insight by Mannoni, what are the implications of any role that the U.S. might choose to play in Asia?

Relate the passage, if you wish, also to previous units.

The Boston Globe, May 1, 1970

TEXT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPEECH ON CAMBODIA

WASHINGTON (AP)--Following is the prepared text of President Nixon's speech on U.S. forces in Cambodia, Thursday night:

Ten days ago, in my report to the Nation on Vietnam, I announced a decision to withdraw an additional one hundred and fifty thousand American troops over the next year. I said then I was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and in South Vietnam.

At that time, I warned that if I concluded that increased enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam, I would not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Despite that warning, North Vietnam has increased its military aggression in all three areas--particularly in Cambodia.

After full consultation with the National Security Council, Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and my other advisers, I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last ten days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after our withdrawal of 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs, I have concluded the time has come for action.

Tonight, I shall describe the actions of the enemy, the actions I have ordered to deal with that situation, and the reasons for my decision.

Cambodia, a small country of seven million people has been a neutral nation since the Geneva Agreement of 1954--an agreement signed by the Government of North Vietnam.

American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people. We have maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than fifteen in Cambodia's capital since last August. For the previous four years--from 1965-1969, we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever. For the past five years, we have provided no military assistance and no economic assistance whatever to Cambodia.

North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality.

For the past five years--as indicated on this map--North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia. They are used for hit-and-run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

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These Communist occupied territories contain major base camps, training sites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, air strips and prisoner of war compounds.

For five years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam moved against those enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counselled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our commanders.

In contrast to our policy, the enemy in the past two weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is concentrating his main forces in the sanctuaries where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are encircling the Capital of Phnom Penh. Cambodia has sent out a call to the United States and a number of other nations for assistance.

If this effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier--and a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.

North Vietnamese men and supplies could then be poured into that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our own men but the people of South Vietnam as well.

Confronted with this situation, we have three options.

First, we can do nothing. The ultimate result of that course of action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the Americans remaining in Vietnam after our next withdrawal would be gravely threatened.

Our second option is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia. Unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of seven million Cambodians whose country is being invaded, massive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by the small Cambodian Army against the immediate threat. With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army needs and can use now for its defense. The aid we will provide will be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality--not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.

Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble. That means cleaning out major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong occupied sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. Some of these are as close to Saigon as Baltimore is to Washington.

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This is my decision:

In cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam, attacks are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border.

A major responsibility for the ground operations is being assumed by South Vietnamese forces. For example, the attacks in several areas including the Parrot's Beak are exclusively South Vietnamese ground operations under South Vietnamese command with the United States providing air and logistical support.

There is one area, however, where I have concluded that a combined American and South Vietnamese operation is necessary. Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong for years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.

This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and their military supplies destroyed, we will withdraw..

These actions are in no way directed at the security interests of any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility and at its own initiative and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

A majority of the American people are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program.

A majority of the American people want to end this war rather than have it drag on interminably. The action I take tonight will serve that purpose.

A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal.

We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire. We have made and will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference table rather than through more fighting on the battlefield.

Let us look at the record. We have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over twenty percent. We have offered to withdraw all of our men if they withdraw theirs. We have offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition--that the future of South Vietnam be determined not by North Vietnam, not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves.

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Their answer has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam designed to increase American casualties.

This attitude has become intolerable. We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protests. If we did, the credibility of the United States would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression.

Tonight, I again warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces I shall meet my responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men.

This action puts the leaders of North Vietnam on notice that we will be patient in working for peace, we will be conciliatory at the conference table, but, we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated. We will not allow American men by the thousands to be killed by an enemy from privileged sanctuaries.

The time came long ago to end this war through peaceful negotiations. We stand ready for those negotiations. We have made major efforts, many of which must remain secret. All the offers and approaches made previously remain on the conference table whenever Hanoi is ready to negotiate seriously.

But if the enemy response to our most conciliatory offers for peaceful negotiation continues to be to increase its attacks and humiliate and defeat us we shall react accordingly.

We live in an age of anarchy both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last five hundred years. Here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without.

If when the chips are down the U.S. acts like a pitiful helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.

It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight. The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warning, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people, and uses our prisoners as hostages?

If we failed to meet this challenge all other nations will be on notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States, when a real crisis comes, will be found wanting.

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My fellow Americans: During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home.

I promised to end the war. I shall keep that promise.

I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise.

We shall avoid a wide war. But we are also determined to put an end to this war.

In this room, Woodrow Wilson made the great decisions which led to victory in World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in Korea and avoided war in the Middle East. John F. Kennedy, in his finest hour, made the great decision which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the Western Hemisphere.

The decision I have announced tonight is not of the same magnitude. Between those decisions and this decision, however, there is a difference that is very fundamental. In those decisions, the American people were not assailed by counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of the nation.

A Republican Senator has said that this action means my party has lost all chance of winning the November elections. Others are saying today that this move against the enemy sanctuaries will make me a one-term President.

No one is more aware than I of the political consequences of the action I have taken. It is tempting to take the easy political path: (1) To blame this war on previous Administrations and to bring all of our men home immediately regardless of the consequences; even though that would mean defeat for the United States; (2) To desert 18 million South Vietnamese people who have put their trust in us and to expose them to the same slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Vietnam inflicted on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the Communists took over North Vietnam; (3) To get peace at any price now even though I know that a peace of humiliation for the United States will lead to a bigger war or surrender later.

But I have rejected all political considerations in making this decision.

Whether my party gains in November is nothing compared to the lives of 400 thousand brave Americans fighting, for our country and for the cause of peace and freedom in Vietnam. Whether I may be a one-term President is insignificant compared to whether by our failure to act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period. I would rather be a one-term President than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second rate power and see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.

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I realize that in this war there are honest and deep differences about whether we should have ever become involved in Vietnam. There are differences as to how the war should be conducted. But the decision I announce tonight transcends those differences.

For the lives of American men are involved. The opportunity for 150,000 American men to come home over the next twelve months is involved. The future of 18 million in South Vietnam and seven million people in Cambodia is involved. The possibility of winning a just peace in Vietnam and in the Pacific is at stake.

It is customary in a speech from the White House to ask support for the President of the United States. Tonight, what I ask for is more important. I ask for support of our brave men fighting tonight half-way around the world--not for territory--not for glory--but so that their younger brothers and their sons and your sons will be able to live in peace and freedom.

Questions

1. What are the main reasons Nixon says he must send troops to Cambodia? In his speech, he suggests that if the U.S. does not invade Cambodia, "forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world". Why would he say this? Do you agree with him?
2. Nixon says he is aware of the internal political consequences of his actions but has rejected these considerations in making his decision. Is it wise to disregard internal consequences of foreign policy decisions? If he had taken them into account, would his decision have been different?
3. Relate this decision and the reasons Nixon gives for his decision to the general Asian doctrine Nixon stated in his speech in Guam. Are his actions in Cambodia consistent with the aims of his Asian policy?
4. Relate the decision and the reasons for the decision to your own ideas about the role of the U.S. in Asia. Would you have decided to invade Cambodia? Why or why not?